G.R. No. 237874 - Wycoco vs. Aquino

The case involves petitioners Filipinas Industrial Corporation, Ruben & Co., Inc., and Honorio Allado versus respondent Judge Lourdes P. San Diego of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, and Pastor D. Ago.
Pastor D. Ago acted in his capacity as attorney-in-fact for Francisco Laiz, based on a special power of attorney executed in favor of Pastor Ago.
The power of attorney, attached to the complaint as Annex A, shows that Francisco Laiz is a resident of General Santos, Cotabato.

On May 3, 1963, Pastor D. Ago filed a complaint for damages with preliminary attachment and injunction in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-7228.
The complaint named multiple defendants, including Filipinas Industrial Corporation, Ruben & Company, Incorporated, Honorio Allado, Arnaldo Borre, and Emilio Ongoy, with the allegations specifying the residences or principal offices of the parties involved.
The complaint asserted that Pastor D. Ago, as the duly authorized agent of Francisco Laiz, had full power to sue and file the complaint on behalf of Laiz.

On May 16, 1963, the petitioners (defendants in the lower court proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the venue was improperly laid since the real party in interest, Francisco Laiz, is a resident of General Santos, Cotabato.
The motion argued that because the complaint was essentially a personal action for the benefit of Laiz, it should have been filed in the proper venue—either in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato or Davao City.
On May 17, 1963, the petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, alleging additionally that the action was improperly brought in the name of Pastor D. Ago instead of the real party in interest.

Pastor D. Ago opposed the motions to dismiss by arguing that Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court provides that an action may be filed in the plaintiff’s (his) residence, which was Quezon City, and further asserted that he was not a mere agent but was empowered to represent Laiz.
The respondent Judge Lourdes P. San Diego denied both the original motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion on August 12, 1963.

In her order, the Judge held that under the law of agency, an agent expressly authorized to sue on behalf of his principal may file an action in his own name.
Furthermore, she noted that by voluntarily appearing in court via several motions, the petitioners had effectively waived any defect regarding the venue.

After a motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioners (now as respondents in the certiorari petition) sought review on the ground that Judge San Diego acted with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction.

The principal legal issue was whether an attorney-in-fact, even if expressly authorized by a principal via a power of attorney, may bring an action in his own name for a disclosed principal.
The case also involved the proper interpretation of Section 2 of Rule 3 of the (old) Rules of Court, which mandates that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.

May an attorney-in-fact, when so authorized in the power of attorney, bring an action in his own name for a disclosed principal?

Does the filing of a complaint by an attorney-in-fact in his own name, despite the clear designation of a principal beneficiary, violate the requirement that actions be initiated by the real party in interest?
Was the lower court’s ruling, which denied the motions to dismiss due to the agent’s appearance and venue selection, a proper exercise of judicial discretion?