G.R. No. 186339 - Mateo vs. Department of Agrarian Reform

The petitioners, Ramona Favis-Velasco and Elvira L. Yulo, filed a Complaint-Affidavit against respondent Jaye Marjorie R. Gonzales and others for 35 counts each of Estafa by unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence (Article 315, paragraph 1(b)) and Estafa by false pretenses (Article 315, paragraph 2(a)) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The complaint was referred to the Office of City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City where Assistant City Prosecutor Gilbert R. Alcala dismissed the complaint on November 13, 2013 for lack of probable cause.
Petitioners then elevated the issue by filing a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary, who modified the original Resolution, thereby directing the Makati City Prosecutor to file Informations for Estafa under the specified provisions against respondent Jaye, while dismissing charges against other respondents.
Subsequent procedural steps involved respondent Jaye’s motions: a Motion for Reconsideration and a motion to defer action, as well as the filing of four consolidated Informations on January 11, 2016 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
The case underwent further adjudication in the Court of Appeals (CA). Key submissions include:

On November 23, 2017, the CA issued a Decision granting the petition filed by respondent Jaye, thereby annulling the DOJ Secretary’s Resolution dated July 15, 2015 and reinstating the 2013 Resolution of Prosecutor Alcala, leading to the dismissal of the complaint and the nullification of arrest warrants.
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA on May 3, 2018. After additional submissions, including respondent Jaye’s Comment (October 8, 2018) and petitioners’ Reply (February 21, 2019), the case was finally brought for review before the Supreme Court.

They claimed that all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 1(b) and 2(a) were present.
For Estafa by false pretenses (paragraph 2(a)), they alleged that respondent Jaye falsely represented herself as a licensed broker or part-owner of DAMSI, thereby inducing them to invest their money and causing them significant financial loss.
For Estafa by misappropriation (paragraph 1(b)), they argued that respondent Jaye received their money under an obligation to either deliver or return it, but then misappropriated or converted these funds.

Respondent Jaye maintained that not all elements of the crimes were present.
She argued that the DOJ Secretary exercised grave abuse of discretion when finding probable cause, asserting the lack or excess of jurisdiction.
She further denied receiving the petitioners’ money or misappropriating it, noting that investments were directly transacted through agents (B.A. Securities, Inc. or DAMSI) and not through her personal accounts.
For the estafa by false pretenses charge, respondent stressed that the alleged deceit did not occur prior to or simultaneous with the investment transactions, undermining the essential element of fraud.

The crux of the dispute centered on whether there was sufficient probable cause to indict respondent Jaye for Estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 2(a) and 1(b) of the RPC.
The case identified the importance of a preliminary investigation, which is designed to secure the innocent from unwarranted criminal prosecution and ensure that only well-founded charges proceed.
The CA’s earlier decision sided with respondent Jaye by annulling the DOJ Secretary’s Resolution on probable cause, thus favoring a reinstatement of the earlier resolution dismissing the complaint.

Whether there is probable cause to indict respondent Jaye for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC based on the alleged false pretenses or fraudulent acts.
Whether there is probable cause to charge respondent Jaye with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC for misappropriation or conversion of funds received in trust or under an obligation.
Whether the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction by finding probable cause in violation of the established jurisprudential parameters.