G.R. No. 96202 - Canque vs. Court of Appeals

Plaintiffs-Appellants: Leonor Farrales, assisted by her husband, Emilio Farrales, holding a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods.
Defendants-Appellees: The City Mayor of Baguio, the Chief of Police, the Market Superintendent, and the City Treasurer.
The case originated as an action for damages filed before the Court of First Instance of Baguio, later taken to the Court of Appeals, and finally certified to the Supreme Court on questions of law.

The plaintiff’s temporary building, where she operated her sales stall, was demolished to make way for a permanent market building.
Plaintiff was ordered by city officials to relocate her stall to another temporary location until the permanent building was completed.
Dissatisfied with the designated location, the plaintiff unilaterally erected a temporary shack on a cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section within the Baguio City Market premises.
The temporary shack was constructed without securing the necessary permits or permissions from any city authority.

City police, after threatening to demolish the unauthorized shack, proceeded with its demolition when the plaintiff failed to show a proper permit during a hearing for an injunction.
Materials and goods from the demolished shack were collected and subsequently delivered to the City Hall by the police.
The plaintiff attempted to invoke remedies by citing the police for contempt in a separate petition, which was denied by the trial court in an order dated September 19, 1956.
To evade the implications of res judicata from the earlier action and subsequent decisions, the plaintiff amended her complaint to include the policemen as defendants in her present suit.

The appellant questioned the trial court’s order allowing the defendants to file their answer after the expiration of the reglementary period, noting that a motion to declare defendants in default was not filed in time.
The court explained the procedural anomaly by detailing that the plaintiff’s counsel, initially present and then replaced, had voluntarily withdrawn the motion for default, thereby binding the plaintiff to this course of action.
The appellant further contested on the merits that the temporary structure was not a nuisance per se, or that if it was, its nuisance character was accidental, necessitating judicial abatement rather than immediate police action.

Whether the demolition of the shack by the city police was proper and justified under the circumstances.

Was the police action to demolish the structure legally permissible given that the structure was erected without a permit and in defiance of city orders?
Could the police have waited for the City Engineer or City Health Officer to initiate legal action for abatement instead of acting on their own authority?

Whether the trial court erred in its handling of procedural matters, particularly regarding the expiration of the reglementary period for the defendants to file their answer and the withdrawal of motions by the plaintiff’s counsel.

Did the plaintiff’s counsel’s acts bind the plaintiff and justify the court’s actions regarding default proceedings?

Whether the temporary shack constituted a public nuisance requiring immediate removal.

Was the erected lean-to merely a temporary stall, or did it obstruct the free movement of people as demonstrated by its location on the cement passageway?
Given the structure’s unauthorized nature and obstructive placement, did the circumstances warrant extrajudicial abatement?