G.R. No. L-59603 - Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay

On January 15, 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811 reserving 1,193,669 sqm of public domain in Lapu-Lapu City for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
The reserved area included four parcels totaling 22,328 sqm owned and registered in the name of San Antonio Development Corporation.

EPZA offered to purchase the parcels under the valuation scheme of Section 92, P.D. No. 464 (owner’s declared market value or assessor’s value, whichever is lower).
The parties failed to agree on price.

EPZA filed a complaint for expropriation under P.D. No. 66 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, praying for a writ of possession.
On October 21, 1980, the trial court issued a writ of possession authorizing immediate entry by EPZA.

At pre-trial on February 13, 1981, the parties agreed the sole issue was just compensation; hearing set for April 2, 1981.
On February 17, 1981, the court (a) issued the order of condemnation; and (b) appointed three commissioners under Rule 67, Secs. 5–8, Revised Rules of Court, to ascertain just compensation.

On June 19, 1981, commissioners reported a fair value of ₱15.00 per sqm.
On July 29, 1981, EPZA moved for reconsideration and objected to the report, contending P.D. No. 1533 superseded Rule 67 and limited compensation to the lower of owner’s or assessor’s valuation.
On November 14, 1981, the trial court denied reconsideration and required EPZA to file its objections to the commissioners’ report.
On February 9, 1982, EPZA filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Supreme Court, with a preliminary restraining order, challenging the appointment of commissioners and seeking to prevent further proceedings.

Whether Presidential Decrees Nos. 76, 464, 794, and 1533 repealed or amended Sections 5–8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that just compensation in expropriation proceedings must be based exclusively on the lower of the owner’s declared market value or the assessor’s valuation, thereby eliminating the appointment of commissioners.
Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation prescribed by P.D. No. 1533 is valid and constitutional, or whether it unconstitutionally encroaches on the judiciary’s prerogative and violates due process.