G.R. No. L-20416 - Evangelista vs. Reyes

In October 1960, spouses Cabral initiated a civil complaint entitled “Foreclosure of Chattel Mortgage” in the Municipal Court of Manila against George Tunaya and spouses Juan and Teodora Evangelista.
The complaint sought:

A declaration ordering that, should the defendants fail to pay P1,000.00 (with interest), the mortgaged properties be delivered to the Sheriff of Manila.
Authority for the Sheriff to sell these properties at public auction to satisfy the judgment debt.
Such other relief “just and equitable” as the court might deem appropriate.

The spouses Evangelista, who later became the petitioners in this case, were judgment creditors and successful bidders of properties previously mortgaged by George Tunaya.
These properties had been sold under execution issued on the basis of a judgment in Civil Case No. 5550 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered on June 2, 1960.
The chattel mortgage at issue had been executed and registered on December 12 and 14, 1959, respectively, favoring the plaintiff spouses Cabral.

At the trial in the Municipal Court, the petitioners (defendants in the lower court proceedings) moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Defendant George Tunaya confessed judgment when the matter was set for hearing.
As a result, the Municipal Court rendered a judgment by confession against Tunaya and dismissed the complaint against the Evangelistas.

Following the lower court decision, respondents (plaintiffs Cabral) appealed the judgment to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
On March 24, 1961, the Evangelistas filed a motion in the Court of First Instance to affirm the Municipal Court’s decision and to dismiss the appeal filed by spouses Cabral.
The respondent judge denied this motion on April 4, 1961, without providing any reasons for the denial.

On April 17, 1961, the Evangelistas filed an answer which included an assertion of prescription and a counterclaim for damages.
The respondent spouses Cabral opposed these allegations and counterclaims.
Although the case was set for trial, it was postponed several times to permit submission of memoranda regarding the application of Section 10, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

In their memorandum, the petitioners sought a remand of the case to the Municipal Court of Manila for further proceedings.
Respondents Cabral opposed the remand.

The respondent judge denied the motion to remand on August 31, 1962, and re-set the case for hearing on October 25, 1962.
After a motion for reconsideration of the order was also denied, petitioners interposed the present petition seeking certiorari and prohibition against the last order of the respondent court.

The respondent judge’s refusal to remand the case was contrary to established jurisprudence and law (specifically Section 10, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court).
There was no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available from the orders of the respondent judge except through the present special civil action.
The Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction (both appellate and original) to decide the merits of the case; therefore, it should be remanded to the Municipal Court.

The petitioners contended that the remedy of remand must be granted as a matter of legal principle to avoid confusion and delay in litigation.

The Court observed that by filing an answer in the Court of First Instance—where the case was already on appeal—the petitioners:

Withdrew their prior objections to the court’s taking cognizance of the case under its original jurisdiction.
Indicated their assent to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction as authorized by the last portion of Section 11, Rule 40.

The petitioners’ subsequent insistence that the case be remanded was inconsistent with their earlier voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
The court also rejected the argument that because the suit sought recovery of P1,000.00 it fell below the minimum jurisdictional threshold, noting that the pleadings also involved recovery of possession of mortgaged chattels, which is within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Whether the Evangelistas, by filing their answer in the Court of First Instance, effectively waived their objection to the exercise of the court’s original jurisdiction.
Whether the subsequent attempt to remand the case to the Municipal Court was procedurally and legally tenable after such waiver.

Whether the denial of the motion to remand was in conformity with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 40, which addresses the exercise of jurisdiction when the parties file their pleadings.
Whether the lack of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy from the orders of the respondent judge permitted the petitioners to seek a special civil action for remand.

Whether the suit, which nominally involved recovery of only P1,000.00, should be excluded from the exercise of the Court of First Instance’s original jurisdiction due to the amount in controversy.
The implications of the additional claim for the recovery of possession of mortgaged chattels on the issue of jurisdiction.