G.R. No. 197360 - People vs. Credo

In the national and local elections held on 14 May 2007, both petitioner Jeremias V. Esteves and private respondent Reynaldo Teh Bitong ran for the position of municipal mayor of Casiguran, Aurora.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the duly-elected mayor on 15 May 2007 based on the canvassing results; respondent secured 3,342 votes over petitioner’s 3,294 votes, a margin of 48 votes.

On 25 May 2007, petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, docketed as Election Protest Case (EPC) No. 99 in Branch 96, handled by Judge Corazon D. Soluren.
The RTC issued a precautionary protection order instructing the Municipal Treasurer and Election Officer to safeguard all election paraphernalia (ballot boxes, voter lists, etc.) pending the resolution of the protest.

On 2 August 2007, the RTC admitted the answer filed by private respondent and denied the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of respondent’s counter-protest for non-payment of filing fee.
Subsequently, the RTC ordered the creation of revision committees to facilitate further proceedings.
On 6 September 2007, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the election protest on the ground that it was defective for failing to specify precincts where alleged fraud and irregularities occurred.
The RTC, in its Order dated 8 September 2007, denied the motion to dismiss, thereby allowing the protest to proceed.

Private respondent then escalated the matter by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking to nullify the RTC Order dated 8 September 2007 and to have the election protest dismissed on the basis of non-compliance with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, Section 11(f).
On 6 December 2007, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing Judge Soluren to desist from further proceedings on EPC No. 99.

In response, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 180792, seeking to lift the TRO and enjoin the COMELEC (Second Division) from taking cognizance of the case.
On 15 January 2008, the Supreme Court dismissed G.R. No. 180792 for several technical deficiencies, including the absence of material dates, failure to submit proper proof of identity, inadequate service explanation, and failure to allege a grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC.

On 29 February 2008, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued the resolution that nullified the RTC Order dated 8 September 2007 and dismissed EPC No. 99.
A dissenting opinion was rendered by Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, while it is noted that the third member, Presiding Commissioner Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr., had retired before the issuance of the resolution.
Petitioner raised multiple arguments in its petition:

That the COMELEC (Second Division) lacks jurisdiction to entertain special relief cases such as petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
That the resolution did not fulfill the constitutional requirement of being decided by a majority vote of all its members.
That the resolution contravened the spirit and purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.

The OSG contended that under Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, only private respondent was required to appear to defend not only on his own behalf but also on behalf of the public respondent (COMELEC).
The OSG’s position was eventually accepted by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated 12 August 2008.

Whether the COMELEC (Second Division) possesses the jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari and prohibition in a case involving election protests and interlocutory orders.

Whether the petitioner’s election protest, and subsequent special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, complied with the mandatory procedural requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.

Whether certiorari is an available remedy to challenge a non-final, interlocutory resolution of a COMELEC Division in view of the constitutional and procedural limitations provided.
Whether the petitioner’s contention, arguing that the COMELEC (Second Division) acted without jurisdiction by processing special relief cases, is sustainable.