G.R. No. 45475 - Estate of Barretto y Rocha vs. Mapa

In civil case No. 24803, known as the Mayorazgo Tuason case, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the defendants on June 17, 1936, to deliver to a judicial receiver the sum of P133,690.67, representing the portion of revenues from the mayorazgo to be distributed among the plaintiffs and intervenors.
After the defendants failed to comply within the allotted time, an order was entered on October 17, 1936, for the issuance of a writ of execution against them. Subsequently, on November 3, 1936, the names of the defendants to be executed against were published, and among these was Consuelo Legarda Viuda de Prieto.
Consuelo Legarda Viuda de Prieto, alerted by the issuance of the writ, filed a petition on November 9, 1936, asserting that she was not a party defendant but an intervenor. She claimed her entitlement by virtue of being both a descendant of one of the younger children of the founder of the mayorazgo and a purchaser of a portion of the participations.

The petition emphasized that she had been receiving revenues corresponding to a portion of the share of defendant Mariano S. Tuason through a deed of cession executed on November 7, 1935.
This deed was collateral to payment for a mortgage credit and had been evidenced in previous court proceedings (notably on December 2, 1935, when a receiver bank was ordered to disburse funds from Mariano S. Tuason’s share).
Consequently, the court, on December 17, 1936, modified the earlier order by excluding Consuelo Legarda Viuda de Prieto and substituting Mariano S. Tuason as the named defendant, a decision which was later reconsidered by motions filed by the plaintiffs and intervenors.

The dispute arises from the established family trust in the foundation of the mayorazgo by Antonio Ma. Barretto.

The founder’s instrument provided that “one-fifth of the net revenue derived from the entail each year” was to be set apart and divided equally among his eight children (or their descendants, in the absence of survivors).
A special family trust was thereby created, separate from the general entail, with the purpose of ensuring a perpetual distribution of revenue among the specified beneficiaries.

The case references earlier jurisprudence (notably Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888) which clarified that while the first-born possessed the usufruct of the entailed properties, the younger children had the right only to a fifth of the revenues, later converted into a participation in the properties.

The petitioners contend that the family trust imposed a lien in their favor on all the properties of the mayorazgo, intended to secure the payment of the fifth of the revenues.
Conversely, the respondent and the court questioned whether such lien or encumbrance was a mere personal obligation or whether it carried a real, enforceable charge on the properties.
Legal discussion further revolved around the absence of any contractual, statutory, or registered mortgage—whether implied or general—that could validate a lien against real estate as security for the trust indebtedness.

The plaintiffs and intervenors filed motions for reconsideration of the order modifying the parties against whom the writ of execution was directed.
The court denied these motions and eventually denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, leading to further detailed analysis of whether the nature of the obligation is personal or if it implicates a real lien on the properties.

Is the liability incurred by the defendants, which pertains to Mariano S. Tuason’s share in the entailed properties, merely a personal (simple) obligation?
Or does the obligation, by virtue of the family trust, create a real lien (or encumbrance) on all or part of the entailed properties?

Does the family trust, as established in the founder’s instrument and later modified by the Disentailing Law, carry with it a lien in equity that would affect the entire portfolio of the mayorazgo?
Can such a lien be sustained without the conversion into an express, registered mortgage as required by the Civil Code and Mortgage Law?

Procedural and Substantive Validity of Excluding Consuelo Legarda Viuda de Prieto

Whether the modification of the order to exclude Consuelo Legarda Viuda de Prieto and substitute Mariano S. Tuason was proper under the principles of party presentation (only those directly intervening are bound).
The issue of whether a writ for execution can be issued against her given her status as an intervenor rather than a defendant.

How do the provisions of the Disentailing Law and the subsequent improvements under the Civil Code and Mortgage Law affect the preservation or extinguishment of any implied legal mortgage or lien on the properties of the mayorazgo?
Whether the failure to convert an implied mortgage into a special public mortgage through registration deprives the petitioners of any enforceable lien in equity.