G.R. No. 154130 - Astorga vs. People

Respondent Marie Josephine Panzani was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with three criminal cases:

The offended parties in the murder and frustrated murder cases reserved their right to institute a separate civil action, while in the estafa case, they neither waived nor reserved that right.

In all three cases, petitioners filed a petition for combined writs of certiorari and mandamus challenging the respondent court’s order.
A motion was advanced for the preliminary attachment of the respondent’s properties as security for an eventual civil judgment, based on the grounds provided under Rule 59, section 1, of the new Rules of Court.

The respondent court ordered itself to be without authority to issue writs of preliminary attachment in criminal cases.
This order was applied uniformly despite the underlying differences:

In the murder and frustrated murder cases (where civil actions were separately reserved), the civil component was considered not instituted together with the criminal action.
In the estafa case, since the offended parties neither waived nor reserved their civil action, the civil liability was deemed to be impliedly instituted along with the criminal charges.

Rule 107, section 1 of the new Rules of Court stipulates that “when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.”
Rule 124, section 6 provides that all auxiliary writs, including the preliminary attachment, may be employed by the court to enforce its judgment if they are necessary to carry the jurisdiction into effect.

Petitioners sought to annul the respondent court’s order denying the issuance of a preliminary attachment writ by arguing that the court, having jurisdiction over the civil action in the estafa case, ought also to exercise its power to secure that civil remedy.
Respondents relied on prior decisions (U. S. v. Namit and People v. Moreno) which held that preliminary attachment was not proper in criminal cases, based on the view that attachment was a purely statutory remedy with no clear provision authorizing it in criminal proceedings.

The majority opinion, penned by Justice Moran and concurred by other justices (including Bocobo in a distinct concurring view), held that under the new Rules, where the civil action is impliedly instituted, the auxiliary power to issue preliminary attachment is valid.
Conversely, in the criminal cases for murder and frustrated murder where the civil action was not instituted, the court properly lacked jurisdiction to order preliminary attachment.

Does a criminal court have the inherent jurisdiction to issue auxiliary writs, such as the preliminary attachment, when the criminal action is coupled with an implied civil action for recovery of damages?
Is there a sufficient statutory basis under the new Rules of Court (particularly Rule 107 and Rule 124) that authorizes the issuance of preliminary attachment in criminal cases where the civil action has been impliedly instituted?

Should the respondent court be bound by precedents (such as U. S. v. Namit and People v. Moreno) that held preliminary attachment in criminal cases was improper, or do the new Rules of Court provide a basis for a different interpretation?
Does the act of a trial court following previous decisions (even if later deemed mistaken) shield it from being subject to certiorari or mandamus for legal error?

How does the reservation or waiver of the civil action by the offended party affect the court’s power to issue auxiliary writs such as preliminary attachment?
Should the civil component be treated distinctly when the offended party reserves the right to institute it separately, thereby depriving the court of the ancillary jurisdiction to secure civil damages?