G.R. No. 112060 - Edding vs. Commission on Elections

During the May 1992 elections for the municipal mayoralty of Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte, petitioner Norbi H. Edding and respondent Pablo S. Bernardo were candidates.
After canvassing of the election returns, Bernardo was declared the winner with a winning margin of 212 votes.
Alleging massive election fraud, Edding filed an election protest on June 9, 1992, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, under Election Case No. SE-10.

Following the termination of the protest proceedings and a recounting of ballots, the RTC rendered a judgment on July 2, 1993, proclaiming Edding as the winner and declaring Bernardo’s election null and void.
On July 8, 1993, Bernardo filed a Notice of Appeal while Edding moved for the immediate execution of the RTC’s decision.
Although Bernardo opposed the motion for immediate execution on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal and cited Section 17 of Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the RTC, on July 13, 1993, granted Edding’s motion for immediate execution and ordered that the case records be forwarded to the COMELEC.

Edding assumed office as the municipal mayor on July 15, 1993, replacing Bernardo.
On July 16, 1993, Bernardo filed a Petition for Certiorari with an Application for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the COMELEC (SPR No. 5-93), aiming to enjoin the RTC’s order that granted execution pending appeal.
The COMELEC gave due course to Bernardo’s petition and, on July 19, 1993, issued a temporary restraining order.
The COMELEC later issued its Order on September 23, 1993, which Edding received on October 12, 1993, thereby triggering the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Edding argued that, absent a constitutional or statutory grant, the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. He supported his contention by citing previous decisions (e.g., Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al. and Uy vs. COMELEC, et al.) that denied the COMELEC such authority.
Edding further relied on the decision in Tobon-Uy vs. COMELEC, which affirmed that the RTC retains authority to grant execution pending appeal and that the COMELEC cannot usurp this function.
Respondents, conversely, contended that the COMELEC’s power to issue such writs is found in Sections 2(2) and 3 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which grant it appellate jurisdiction over election cases, thereby justifying its action in issuing the writs.

Historically, the rule was that COMELEC had no power to issue the writs in the absence of an explicit constitutional or statutory grant, as laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC and affirmed in subsequent cases such as the Garcia and Tobon-Uy decisions.
The present case references the Supreme Court’s decision in Relampagos vs. Cumba and the COMELEC, which upheld the jurisdiction of COMELEC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Section 50 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697.
This provision, though originally intended for other election contests, remained effective beyond the 1984 elections and served as a remedial measure to harmonize jurisdictional authority between the COMELEC and the proceedings in the RTC.

Although the legal controversy centered on the COMELEC’s jurisdiction, it was noted that the filing of the notice of appeal by Bernardo did not divest the RTC of its jurisdiction to resolve the pending motion for execution.
The trial court’s authority to address the motion for immediate execution did not lapse with the filing of Bernardo’s notice of appeal since it was filed within the reglementary five-day period following the RTC’s promulgation of its decision.
However, given that the term of office for the contested mayoralty and the electoral term had progressed (with the office set to expire on June 30, 1995), compounded by the conclusion of the subsequent election, the case eventually became moot.

Does the COMELEC have the constitutional and statutory authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against interlocutory orders of the RTC in election cases?
Specifically, can the COMELEC enjoin the execution of an RTC order granted pending appeal?

Does the filing of a notice of appeal by one party divest the RTC of its jurisdiction to determine and execute motions filed within the reglementary period?
How does the timely filing of opposing motions affect the RTC’s jurisdiction, especially in the context of pending sales of execution?

Given that the contested mayoralty term was nearing expiration and subsequent elections had concluded, does the pending petition maintain its practical relevance, or is it rendered moot by changed circumstances?