G.R. No. 184148 - Calalang-Parulan vs. Calalang-Garcia

A letter-complaint dated March 20, 1990, addressed to then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, was submitted by General Renato de Villa (then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines). This letter alleged that several individuals, including private respondent Homobono Adaza, were involved in the failed December 1989 coup d’état.
The letter-complaint was supported by affidavits from high-ranking military officers—Brigadier General Alejandro Galido, Captain Oscarlito Mapalo, Colonel Juan Mamorno, Colonel Hernani Figueroa, and Major Eduardo Sebastian—lending credence to the allegations.
Based on these submissions, the Department of Justice referred the matter to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors, established pursuant to DOJ Order No. 5 dated January 10, 1990.

Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe, acting as Team Leader, found sufficient basis to continue the inquiry and issued subpoenas to the individuals named in the letter-complaint, including Adaza.
A panel of investigators—headed by Prosecutor George Arizala with members Ferdinand Abesamis and Cesar Solis—was designated to conduct the preliminary investigation.
On April 17, 1990, the panel released an 18-page resolution concluding that there was probable cause to hold the respondents for trial on the crimes of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder.
This resolution led to the filing of a criminal Information (docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-11855) on April 18, 1990, charging private respondent Adaza with the aforesaid crimes.

Aggrieved by the initiation of criminal proceedings against him, private respondent Adaza filed a complaint for damages on July 11, 1990 (Civil Case No. Q-90-6073), alleging that the petitioners had engaged in a deliberate, willful, and malicious act by instituting criminal charges for a non-existent offense.
On October 15, 1990, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint failed to state any actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of action.
The trial judge, Hon. George C. Macli-ing, denied this motion on February 8, 1991 and, upon a motion for reconsideration, again denied it on May 14, 1991, requiring the petitioners to file their answer within fifteen (15) days.

Instead of filing an answer, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on June 5, 1991 before the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. No. 25080), alleging grave abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying the Motion to Dismiss.
The Court of Appeals, in Resolutions dated January 31, 1992 and, upon a Motion for Reconsideration, dated September 2, 1992, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
On March 8, 1993, the petition was reinstated by this Court, accompanied by a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Judge from further action on Civil Case No. Q-90-6073.
In his subsequent comment, respondent Adaza attempted to re-characterize his claim as a suit for damages based on tort (including an alleged violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019) rather than as a case of malicious prosecution—a change not supported by the original allegations in his complaint.

Whether respondent Adaza’s complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for malicious prosecution.

Did the complaint allege all the essential elements—including initiation of the prosecution, termination of the case in the plaintiff’s favor (typically by acquittal), and absence of probable cause?
Was a change in legal theory (from tort to malicious prosecution) permissible on appeal when such elements were not initially alleged?

Whether the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Did the trial judge properly consider the insufficiency of the complaint’s averments regarding the elements of malicious prosecution?
Was it proper for the trial judge to require an answer when the essential factual allegations necessary to sustain a malicious prosecution claim were absent?

Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy in addressing the alleged grave abuse of discretion, especially in light of the procedural posture and the proper remedies available to the parties.