G.R. No. 160445 - Mercado vs. Security Bank Corp.

Petitioner Rico V. Domingo, sole proprietor of R.V. Domingo and Associates Law Firm, alleged that respondent Ramon Gil S. Macapagal, then Vice President for Corporate Affairs and Sustainability and head of the Brand Protection Department of Unilever Philippines, Inc. (ULP), overcharged legal fees.
On October 25, 2013, petitioner’s law firm received an e-mail from respondent’s Executive Assistant, Rose Aquino, informing that the invoices submitted were incorrect. The message stated that, based on a 2001 SDAP schedule, the fee was P4,000.00 per appearance (with variations based on location) and that petitioner had charged P6,500.00 per appearance and per diem, thus overbilling ULP.
In response to this e-mail, petitioner replied, apparently indignant at the charge of overbilling, which led to a follow-up letter from respondent dated October 30, 2013.

The respondent’s letter defended the billing based on the 2001 SDAP agreement and argued that the amendment allegedly made in 2003, which increased the rate to P6,500.00, was not properly validated nor uniformly applied with similar engagements involving other corporate clients.
The letter also pointed out inconsistencies regarding signatures and the submission of the amended agreement indicated in previous communications.

Aggrieved by the correspondence, petitioner filed a criminal Complaint for Libel before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP)-Quezon City.
Initially, the OCP-Quezon City, in its Resolution dated May 11, 2015, dismissed the complaint finding no probable cause to indict respondent for libel.
Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the same prosecutorial office reversed its earlier dismissal and decreed that an Information for Libel against respondent be filed.
On July 27, 2015, the OCP-Quezon City filed the Information for Libel in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City as Criminal Case No. R-QZN-15-07104-CR, Branch 101.

RTC Judge Evangeline C. Castillo-Marigomen initially found probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent based on the Information for Libel.
After respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, the RTC judge issued an Order on March 7, 2016, effectively dismissing the Information for Libel.
Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration of the dismissal was denied.
Petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) followed, which was initially dismissed as the issue was deemed moot owing to the eventual filing of an Information before the RTC.
Upon reconsideration, the CA initially annulled the RTC judge’s dismissal order, arguing that the judicial pronouncement on the nature of the e-mail went to the merits and should be decided on trial.
However, following respondent’s motion for partial reconsideration, the CA reverted to its earlier position by reinstating the RTC judge’s dismissal orders.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA, which was denied in a Resolution dated September 12, 2018.
Thereafter, petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari, coupled with an application for a preliminary injunction to protect his right to lodge a criminal complaint for libel.

The records indicate that petitioner received the copy of the RTC Order affirming the dismissal on September 22, 2016.
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal within the prescribed 15-day reglementary period, petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari on November 21, 2016—a delay that rendered the appeal procedurally defective.
The petition for certiorari was premised on the claim that the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion by later conducting a secondary preliminary investigation and dismissing the case based on that inquiry.

Whether the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction by conducting a second preliminary investigation and subsequently dismissing the criminal Information for Libel.
Whether respondent’s e-mail and letter, sent in addressing alleged overbilling, were libelous—i.e., whether the contents of the communications were sufficiently defamatory and issued with the requisite malicious intent.
Whether petitioner’s filing of a petition for certiorari, instead of a timely Notice of Appeal, renders his appeal procedurally improper and moot.