G.R. No. 48090 - Dolores vs. Arro

On January 31, 1941, Dolores Pacheco, in her capacity as guardian of the minors Concepcion, Alicia, and Herminia Yulo, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.
The petition sought review of a Court of Appeals judgment which affirmed an earlier decision by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros (dated March 21, 1939) ordering Jose Yulo y Regalado to execute deeds of assignment to the petitioners for several lots.
The lots in question were identified by lot numbers and were situated in the municipality of Isabela, Occidental Negros, particularly along the then-called Zamora and Quezon streets.

Prior to the changes in the cadastral registration, an agreement was reached in open court before Hon. Juez Norberto Romualdez.

Jose Yulo y Regalado, the defendant (later represented by his heirs due to his death), was in dispute with the petitioners over the title to the contested lots.
The parties reached an understanding that if the names of Zamora and Quezon streets were changed to T. Yulo and G. Regalado (the names of the defendant’s parents), then the defendant would donate or assign the lots to the respective claimants.

Following the agreement, the petitioners, who were represented by their lawyer Don Agustin P. Seva, withdrew their earlier claims and the evidentiary proofs they had presented before a referee in the cadastral case.
Partial compliance occurred when, in May and June 1928, the defendant executed deeds (Exhibits D, E, F, G, H, and I) for some claimants, effectively transferring titles that were subsequently recorded in the Register of Property.
Subsequently, the defendant refused to execute similar deeds for all remaining claimants on grounds of perceived ingratitude over a political matter, despite the clear obligation under the prior agreement.

The proceedings involved crucial documentary evidence including the transcript of stenographic notes (marked as Exhibit B) taken during a session held in the First Instance Court in Negros Occidental on December 3, 1917.
Exhibit B detailed the oral representations made by Dr. Mariano Yulo (representing the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners), whereby he promised that upon the change of the street names, the title to the lots would be conveyed to the petitioners.
The petitioners later raised objections against the evidentiary status of Exhibit B, asserting it lacked certification or authentication by the court clerk or a notary. However, it was noted that the original transcript had been admitted in the cadastral case and formed part of the record upon which the trial court base its decision.

The withdrawal of the respondents’ claims based on the promise made in open court gave rise to a fiduciary or trust-like relationship.
The defendant (or his heirs), having acquired the titles as a mere depositary with the obligation to transfer the lot titles upon fulfillment of a condition (the change of street names), could not later invoke the defense of prescription to avoid his fiduciary duty.
The trial court, noting the confidence reposed by the petitioners in the defendant’s promise, emphasized that a trustee’s duty prevails and that the statute of limitations should not bar the petitioners’ claim.

Whether the unauthenticated copy of the transcript of stenographic notes (Exhibit B), lacking certification by the clerk or notary, should be accepted as valid evidence considering it was part of the original record of the cadastral proceeding.
Whether the evidentiary value of Exhibit B was diminished by its lack of formal authentication.

Whether a trustee or a party acting as a mere depositary of title, who acquired the title subject to an express promise to transfer it, may invoke the defense of prescription to bar the petitioners’ claim.
Whether the promise made in open court, which induced the petitioners to withdraw their claims in the cadastral case, creates a binding fiduciary obligation enforceable through specific performance.

Whether the statute of limitations, which might normally bar an action for the recovery of property, is inapplicable in cases where a fiduciary relationship (or trust) is established through a promise made in open court.

Whether precedents concerning the enforcement of agreements—especially those based on a "doubtful right"—support holding that the trustee must honor his promise regardless of any technical defenses such as prescription.