G.R. No. 145420 - Dinglasan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

On August 17, 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation, represented by its President A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr., and Antrom, Inc., represented by its President Antonio Garcia Jr., entered into a memorandum of agreement.
The agreement provided that Antrom would extend credit accommodation to finance Elmyra’s prawn business, with Elmyra issuing checks to guarantee repayment.
Over time, Elmyra’s indebtedness to Antrom reached P1,476,000.58.

As an initial payment, Dinglasan issued Commercial Bank Check No. HO270451, which was postdated on October 3, 1985, in the amount of P515,000.00.
Upon presentment, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds in the account.

On December 16, 1985, an Information charging Dinglasan with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) was filed before the RTC of Makati, Branch 62 (Criminal Case No. 21238).
The Information alleged that Dinglasan willfully issued a check without having sufficient funds and failed to make good the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor.
On December 16, 1991, the trial court found Dinglasan guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment, imposed a fine of P200,000.00, and ordered him to indemnify Antrom the amount of P515,000.00 with legal interest from October 3, 1985.

Dinglasan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on September 4, 1992, for lack of merit.
He appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals on September 25, 1992.
On October 26, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal, thereby affirming the trial court’s decision in toto.
A Petition for Review on Certiorari was later filed with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 137800).
The Supreme Court, in a resolution dated June 28, 1999, denied the petition for review for failure to establish a reversible error, and subsequent motions for reconsideration were dismissed or noted without action.
The judgment became final and executory on October 14, 1999.

On October 30, 2000, Dinglasan filed a petition for new trial and, in the alternative, for reopening the case based on newly discovered evidence.
The newly discovered evidence consisted of affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan (Executive Vice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra during 1985–1986) and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan (wife of the former company cashier), as well as a transmittal letter dated October 8, 1985.
The affidavits and transmittal letter purported to show that Dinglasan had, in fact, made good on the payment within five banking days from the notice of dishonor.
Dinglasan argued that, had this evidence been available and admitted, it would have altered or nullified his conviction for the offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

Private respondent Antrom argued that the petition should be dismissed both procedurally and substantively.
It was contended that the motion for new trial was filed more than a year after the judgment became final, which is contrary to the requirements under the Revised Rules of Court.
Antrom further argued that the evidence was not “newly discovered” because the transmittal letter and related documents had already been submitted in previous proceedings before both the Ministry of Justice and the Court of Appeals.

Whether the petition for new trial and reopening of the case was filed within the reglementary period.
Whether the filing should be allowed given that the judgment became final and executory on October 14, 1999, while the petition was filed on October 30, 2000.

Whether the evidence presented (affidavits and transmittal letter) qualifies as “newly discovered” under the rules governing motion for a new trial.
Whether the alleged evidence, if admitted, would have been material enough to affect the outcome of the trial.
Whether the evidence meets the requisites under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding newly discovered evidence.

Whether allowing the petition would undermine the doctrine of finality of judgment.
Whether the petitioner’s argument that the judgment’s finality should be reckoned from the receipt of a denied motion for reconsideration holds merit in light of existing jurisprudence and rules prohibiting a second motion for reconsideration.