Case Digest (G.R. No. 193007) Core Legal Reasoning Model
Core Legal Reasoning Model
Facts:
In Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 193007, decided July 19, 2011; reported 669 Phil. 371, June 25, 2012), petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Timbol sought declaratory relief to prevent the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) from imposing value-added tax (VAT) on toll fees collected by private tollway operators beginning August 16, 2010. Diaz, a former congressman who sponsored the 1994 Expanded VAT Law and the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), together with Timbol, a former Trade and Industry Assistant Secretary and TRB consultant, claimed injury as regular toll users and by virtue of their public service backgrounds. They argued that toll fees are “user’s taxes,” not sales of services, and thus exempt from VAT under the NIRC, and that imposing VAT would violate the Constitution’s contract non-impairment clause and the formula set by the Toll Regulatory Board. The Supreme Court issued a tem Case Digest (G.R. No. 193007) Expanded Legal Reasoning Model
Expanded Legal Reasoning Model
Facts:
- Petition and parties
- Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol, regular users of tollways, filed a petition for declaratory relief (later treated as one for prohibition) against the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, seeking to enjoin the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) from imposing value-added tax (VAT) on toll fees.
- They contended that (a) Congress did not intend to include toll fees within “sale of services” under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC); (b) toll fees are a “user’s tax,” not a sale of services; (c) VAT on toll fees would constitute a tax on public service; and (d) because VAT was not factored into the approved toll-setting formula, its imposition violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
- Procedural history and lower pleadings
- On August 13, 2010, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining VAT implementation and required respondents to comment within ten days. The petition was subsequently treated as one for prohibition.
- The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Department of Finance and the BIR, argued that Section 108 of the NIRC unambiguously subjects “all kinds of services” by franchise grantees—expressly including tollway operations—to VAT; that petitioners lacked standing to invoke non-impairment claims; and that the parametric formula’s exclusion of VAT was irrelevant to tax liability.
- In their reply, petitioners disputed (a) the classification of tollway operators as franchise grantees; (b) the legality of BIR’s rounding-off scheme and escrow account for excess collections; and (c) BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular 63-2010’s directive to forgo the 2% transitional input VAT credit under Section 111 of the NIRC.
- Respondents moved for reconsideration of the Court’s treatment of the petition as one for prohibition, asserting the action properly fell under declaratory relief and did not meet Rule 65 requirements.
Issues:
- Procedural issues
- May the Court treat a petition filed for declaratory relief as one for prohibition?
- Do petitioners Diaz and Timbol have legal standing (locus standi) to challenge the BIR’s VAT imposition?
- Substantive issues
- Whether the NIRC (Section 108) unlawfully expanded VAT coverage by including tollway operations as “sale of services” and classifying tollway operators as “franchise grantees.”
- Whether VAT on tollway operations:
- Amounts to a tax on tax (i.e., a user’s tax).
- Impairs tollway operators’ right to a reasonable return under their Toll Operating Agreements (TOAs).
- Is administratively infeasible or incapable of implementation.
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Doctrine:
- (Subscriber-Only)