G.R. No. 109698 - Diaz vs. Court of Appeals

On January 23, 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed an application with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) seeking approval for the sound value appraisal of its property in service.
The appraisal was conducted by the Asian Appraisal Company, which valued DLPC’s property and equipment as of March 12, 1990, at P1,141,774,000.00.

On December 6, 1992, the ERB approved the application.
In the approved valuation, an amount of P14,800,000.00 was deducted, corresponding to property and equipment not utilized in DLPC’s operations.

On July 6, 1992, petitioners Antonio Diaz and Kosumo Dabaw filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
The petition challenged the ERB’s decision on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioners alleged procedural deficiencies such as:

Failure to state the date on which they received notice of the ERB decision.
Failure to specify the date when a motion for reconsideration was filed.
Inconsistencies regarding the dates on which they purportedly received the denial of their motion by the ERB.

On September 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved the matter by referring the case for further disposition to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on two grounds:

The petition for review via the Supreme Court was filed using the wrong mode of appeal.
The petition did not comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 1-88 and related procedural requirements.

On December 18, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the issuance of the Supreme Court’s resolution was an instruction for the Court of Appeals to ignore the circular.
The Court of Appeals, by its resolution on March 24, 1993, denied the motion for reconsideration, finding no merit in the arguments raised.

The predecessor of the ERB was the Board of Energy, established under P.D. No. 1206, with decisions originally appealable to the Office of the President.
Under the Interim Rules Implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, decisions of the Board of Energy became appealable to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On February 2, 1987, the New Constitution took effect, and subsequent executive and judicial decisions affected the appellate jurisdiction.
Executive Order No. 172, promulgated on May 8, 1987, created the ERB to replace the Board of Energy.
Although EO No. 172 allowed parties to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court under Sec. 10, it was enacted without the Supreme Court’s advice and concurrence, and hence did not amend the existing appellate rules.
On February 27, 1991, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 1-91 clarifying that the proper mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial agency, including the ERB, is by way of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

Whether petitioners complied with the proper procedural requirements and modes of appeal as mandated by Supreme Court Circulars Nos. 1-88, 2-90, and 1-91.
Whether the petition’s submission to the Supreme Court, instead of the Court of Appeals, constituted a procedural defect amounting to a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal.

Whether the decision of the ERB, including the deduction for unused equipment and property, was within its jurisdiction.
Whether the petitioners’ claim of grave abuse of discretion against the ERB’s decision was substantiated.

Whether the reference of the case from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals in the 8 September 1992 resolution was an instruction to disregard the established procedural circulars.
How the subsequent decisions and publications (i.e., Circular Nos. 1-88 and 2-90) influenced the proper appellate procedure and the dismissal of the petition.