Title
Development Bank of Rizal vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. L-75964
Decision Date
Dec 1, 1987
A bank declared in default challenged a writ of execution, arguing lack of notice and trust-held assets. The Supreme Court ruled execution ministerial but barred it to protect other creditors, citing equitable distribution in liquidation.
A

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-75964)

Facts:

  • Case Background and Parties Involved
    • The petitioner is the Development Bank of Rizal, while the respondents are the Court of Appeals and Ibrahim Omar.
    • Ibrahim Omar, in his capacity as a private respondent, initiated a collection suit against the Development Bank of Rizal (and initially the Central Bank) for a monetary obligation.
    • The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the appellate decision that dismissed its petition and affirmed the trial court’s order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of Ibrahim Omar.
  • Procedural History and Default
    • On March 30, 1984, Ibrahim Omar filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
      • The complaint targeted both the Development Bank of Rizal and the Central Bank.
      • The Central Bank moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of cause of action, resulting in the petitioner remaining as the sole defendant.
    • On May 19, 1984, the petitioner itself filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action, which was denied on August 6, 1984.
    • After receiving the order denying its motion (on August 13, 1984), the petitioner failed to file an answer within the prescribed reglementary period and was subsequently declared in default.
    • As a consequence of the default, Ibrahim Omar was allowed to present his evidence ex parte on November 27, 1984.
    • The petitioner filed a motion on November 23, 1984 to lift the order of default, which the RTC denied on May 3, 1985.
    • A subsequent motion to reconsider the denial was also dismissed on July 19, 1985.
    • On November 12, 1985, the RTC rendered a judgment by default against the petitioner. The judgment ordered the petitioner to pay:
      • P10,119.14 with legal interest from March 13, 1984, until full payment;
      • P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
      • P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
      • The cost of the suit.
  • Execution Proceedings
    • On February 12, 1986, Ibrahim Omar filed an ex parte motion for the execution of the judgment and to approve the bill of costs, which the RTC granted on February 17, 1986.
    • On March 12, 1986, the RTC issued a writ of execution, and the writ was served on the petitioner on March 14, 1986.
      • As a result, the petitioner surrendered specific properties under protest, which included:
        • PROPERTY NO. TRADE MARK-SERIAL NO. 1: MO-095.....BSI-Model 101-Serial No. 153727
ii. PROPERTY NO. TRADE MARK-SERIAL NO. 2: MO-087..... Olympia ES 101-Serial No. 67-0214716 iii. PROPERTY NO. TRADE MARK-SERIAL NO. 3: MO-061.....BSI-Model 101-Serial No. 1537227
  • On March 17, 1986, the petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration seeking to lift the writ and enjoin its execution, requesting also a temporary restraining order.
  • The RTC denied this motion on April 4, 1986.
  • On April 9, 1986, a notice of sale on execution of the petitioner's personal properties was issued, scheduling the sale for April 16, 1986.
  • Petition for Certiorari and Appellate Decision
    • The petitioner sought certiorari before the Court of Appeals, contending that:
      • The writ of execution was null and void because it was issued without a prior hearing.
      • The petitioner had not received a copy of the trial court’s order granting the execution.
      • Its assets were being held in trust by the Monetary Board, which should preclude the execution of the judgment.
    • On September 10, 1986, the appellate court dismissed the petitioner’s petition:
      • It noted that since the petitioner did not contest the merits of the trial court’s decision and the judgment had become final and executory, execution was a matter of right.
      • The issuance of the writ was considered a ministerial duty of the court.
      • Moreover, the fact that no liquidation proceedings had yet been instituted did not justify withholding execution, as there was no evidence of an actual liquidation that would warrant preferential treatment for any creditor.

Issues:

  • Whether a party declared in default is entitled to receive notice of all proceedings subsequent to filing a motion to set aside the order of default.
  • Whether the court is bound by a ministerial duty to order the execution of a judgment once it has become final and executory, notwithstanding any alleged procedural defects such as lack of notice or hearing.
  • Whether the precedent established in Central Bank v. Morfe, which aims to prevent preferential execution against a bank undergoing potential liquidation or rehabilitation, is applicable in this case and should preclude the enforcement of the writ of execution against the petitioner.

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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