G.R. No. 189596 - Department of Justice vs. Alaon

The case involves the Department of Justice (DOJ) as petitioner and Teodulo Nano Alaon as respondent.
Private complainant AAA (whose real identity and related particulars are protected under law) charged Alaon with rape on three separate occasions, the first incident being in October 2000 during an event at a construction site in Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte.

The Provincial Prosecution Office of Daet, Camarines Norte, after finding probable cause under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (in relation to Republic Act No. 7610), initially indicted Alaon for three counts of rape.
On a motion for reconsideration by Alaon, the Provincial Prosecutor downgraded the offense from rape to acts of lasciviousness, basing the decision on:

Evidentiary grounds presented in the motion.
Reference to earlier decisions (e.g., US v. Tan and People v. Domondon) and consideration of the accused's age (73 years old at the time).

A corresponding Information for Acts of Lasciviousness was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte (Criminal Case No. 03-1021).

On January 28, 2003, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong directed the Provincial Prosecutor to forward the entire case records for automatic review and to defer filing (or suspend proceedings) pending such review.
The Secretary’s directive was based on a letter from BBB, who was AAA’s mother, describing the victim’s condition (noted to have an intellectual disability).
Acting on this directive, on February 11, 2003, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carmel Josa Auro Estrellado sent a letter to the presiding judge requesting the withdrawal of the Information for Acts of Lasciviousness.

Judge Leo Intia, while issuing a warrant of arrest, found probable cause against Alaon for Acts of Lasciviousness but, upon processing Prosecutor Estrellado’s communication, suspended issuance of the warrant pending resolution of an alleged petition for review.
On February 12, 2003, the RTC suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-1021, as directed by the Rules of Court.
An Explanation/Manifestation filed on February 26, 2003, by Prosecutor Estrellado clarified that there was no formal petition for review by the accused; the confusion arose from an erroneous assumption.
Alarmed by the suspension and the misinterpretation, Alaon filed a Manifestation with an Urgent Motion to Set the Case for Arraignment, asserting his right to a speedy trial.
The RTC issued orders denying the motion to withdraw the prosecutor’s appearance and later denied a Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Pre-trial proceedings were set for August 27, 2003, and trial ensued thereafter.

On March 18, 2008, the DOJ, through then Undersecretary Ernesto Pineda, issued a Resolution reverting the earlier downgrade by:

Setting aside the supplemental resolution of December 16, 2002, which had modified the charge.
Directing the filing of an Information against Alaon for three counts of rape.

Alaon then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the resolution amounted to a grave abuse of discretion, particularly on the ground that it deprived him of procedural due process by not affording him an opportunity to be heard.
On March 25, 2009, the Court of Appeals granted Alaon’s petition by annulling and setting aside the March 18, 2008, DOJ Resolution, emphasizing that:

The decision treated a letter (from BBB) improperly as an appeal.
Alaon was not given the requisite opportunity to comment, hence violating his procedural rights.

Whether the Secretary of Justice, by reviewing and subsequently modifying the prosecutorial resolution (based on BBB’s letter), acted within his supervisory and controlling authority over subordinate prosecutors.
Whether the act of treating the letter as an appeal—effectively a petition for review—exceeded the bounds of his jurisdiction or amounted to a motu proprio exercise of power.

Whether the failure to afford Alaon an opportunity to be heard on the substantive issues raised in the review (i.e., the shift from rape to acts of lasciviousness and then the reinstatement of rape charges) constituted a denial of procedural due process.
Whether the procedural confusion, including misinterpretations by Prosecutor Estrellado regarding the existence of a petition for review, compromised Alaon’s right to a fair chance to comment on the prosecutorial action.

Whether there existed a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for Alaon under the ordinary course of law to contest the March 18, 2008 Resolution before resorting to a petition for certiorari.