G.R. No. 197676 - Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona on February 7, 1941, and their union produced a daughter, Maria Rosario de Santos (the petitioner).
The marital relationship between Antonio and Sofia became strained, leading to a de facto separation.
In 1949, Antonio obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, U.S.A.—a decree that was not recognized under Philippine laws at the time.
Despite the questionable validity of the divorce, in 1951 Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan, where he married Conchita Talag (the private respondent).
The union with Conchita Talag produced eleven children over the subsequent years.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia Bona died in Guatemala, and less than a month later on April 23, 1967, Antonio and Conchita were married in Tagaytay City under Philippine law.

Dr. Antonio de Santos died intestate on March 8, 1981, leaving behind an estate estimated at P15,000,000.
On May 15, 1981, Conchita Talag filed a petition for letters of administration regarding the settlement of Antonio’s estate, asserting that he was survived by twelve legitimate heirs (herself, the ten surviving children from the second union, and petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos).
Nearly six years into the intestate proceedings, in November 1987, petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos intervened, contending that the ten children born to Conchita were illegitimate since only natural children can be legitimized under Article 269 of the Civil Code.
With no opposition to Conchita’s petition initially, the trial court granted the issuance of letters of administration; however, after the petitioner’s intervention, the trial court, on November 14, 1991, declared those ten children as legitimated heirs alongside petitioner and Conchita.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on January 9, 1992, prompting her to file a petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992.

The case pivots on the interpretation of key provisions of the Civil Code, notably:

Article 269, which states that “only natural children can be legitimated,” meaning that only children born of parents who were not disqualified from marrying each other at the time of conception can be legitimized.
Article 89, which, though dealing with void marriages, treats the resulting offspring as “natural children by legal fiction” and grants them the rights of acknowledged natural children (such as the use of the paternal surname, support, and a share in the legitime from the free disposable portion of the estate).

The factual background underscores the inherent conflict between the petitioner’s claim (based on a strict reading of Article 269) and the legal treatment of children by legal fiction under Article 89.
The case raises the issue of whether the subsequent valid marriage between Antonio and Conchita (after the death of Sofia Bona) can legitimately confer legitimation on Conchita’s children, who were born when Antonio’s prior valid marriage was still subsisting.

The majority (including the main opinion and concurring opinions) held that natural children by legal fiction cannot be elevated to the status of legitimate heirs through subsequent marriage because they do not satisfy the requisites of Article 269.
Dissenting opinions, notably from Justices Vitug, Kapunan, and Pangianban, argued that equitable considerations and the provisions of Article 89 should allow for such legitimation, emphasizing the welfare and rights of the children.
The case further reflects the tension between traditional doctrines inherited from Spanish Civil Law and modern re-interpretations under evolving family laws, including the later Family Code which removed the concept of “natural children by legal fiction.”

Whether children born out of a void (bigamous) marriage—classified as natural children by legal fiction—can be legitimized through the subsequent valid marriage of their parents.
Whether the legal fiction equating these children to acknowledged natural children extends to confer the right of legitimation, as enjoyed by natural children proper under Article 269.

How to reconcile the apparent conflict between Article 269 (limiting legitimation to natural children) and Article 89 (which grants rights to children born from void marriages by legal fiction).
Whether other provisions (Articles 270 and 271 relating to the process of legitimation) modify or limit the scope of Article 269.

The effect of legitimizing children by legal fiction on the distribution of the decedent’s estate, particularly vis-à-vis the rights of the petitioner, the sole legitimate child from the first marriage.
The broader public policy implications—including the sanctity of marriage and the hierarchical classification of children in the Civil Code.