G.R. No. 71537 - De la Paz, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

On May 12, 1983, Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, seeking a judicial declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 901.
The land originally titled in the name of Ponciano de la Paz was the subject of probate proceedings stemming from Ponciano’s testate estate, particularly in Civil Case No. 1399 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The dispute centered on whether the land had been adjudicated to Loreto and her mother—a claim arising from the partition of the estate—or that it was community property shared by the compulsory heirs including petitioners Emilio de la Paz, Jr., Manuela de la Paz, Natividad de la Paz, Margarita de la Paz, Zenaida de la Paz, and petitioner Enrique de la Paz.

Petitioners: Emilio de la Paz, Jr., Enrique de la Paz, Manuela de la Paz, Natividad de la Paz, Margarita de la Paz, and Zenaida de la Paz, who contended that the disputed lot was not part of the probate proceedings and was community property.
Respondents: Included Loreto de la Paz (later substituted by her children and heirs after her death), and other private respondents. Loreto, as the original plaintiff, alleged that the parcel had been adjudicated to her and her mother resulting from the partition.
Notably, petitioner Enrique de la Paz’s claim as a compulsory heir was denied by Loreto, while petitioners maintained that even he was entitled as the son of Ponciano de la Paz, Jr.

The case progressed to trial after failed amicable settlement negotiations.
Evidence was presented with Loreto de la Paz taking the witness stand. Her direct testimony concluded on March 12, 1984, but subsequent cross-examination by the petitioners’ counsel was repeatedly postponed or left incomplete.
Several postponements occurred:

On April 25, 1984, the petitioners’ counsel requested a continuance for an extensive cross-examination after beginning the process.
Corrections were made on May 18, 1984, to the transcript of Loreto’s testimony, leading to further delays and postponements of the scheduled hearings on May 23, July 5, July 11, August 13, and September 18, 1984.
On September 14, 1984, the absence of the petitioners or their counsel led to Loreto’s counsel obtaining permission to present evidence ex parte.
Discussions on the right to cross-examine continued even as the case neared submission for decision, with the petitioners’ counsel ultimately resuming a truncated cross-examination on November 7, 1984.

Loreto de la Paz died on December 1, 1984, prompting the substitution of respondents by her children and heirs.
On January 21, 1985, the petitioners moved to strike Loreto’s entire testimony from the record; this motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied.
On February 11, 1985, the trial court issued an order (with conflicting versions) regarding the status of the evidence and the submission of the case, which later became a critical point on appeal.

On March 29, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 164-A declaring the private respondents (children and heirs of Loreto) as the true owners of the disputed land and awarding them substantial damages.
A petition for review was filed to nullify the appellate court’s decision in AC-G.R. SP No. 05472, which had denied the petitioners’ petition regarding the trial court’s orders.
The petitioners argued that the trial court, particularly through its conflicting issuance of the February 11, 1985 order, deprived them of the opportunity to present evidence, and that their right to cross-examine Loreto was waived by their own repeated delays and absences.

Whether the repeated postponements and the petitioners’ counsel’s failure to appear or adequately conduct the cross-examination amounted to an implied waiver of the right to cross-examine Loreto de la Paz’s testimony.

Whether the issuance of two conflicting versions of the February 11, 1985 order—one dictated in open court and the other a signed order—constituted a grave abuse of discretion that deprived the petitioners of their right to present evidence.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 164-A despite the pending petition seeking to restrain further action.

Whether the trial court’s award of substantial damages (actual, moral, exemplary, and attorney’s fees) to the respondents was adequately supported by the evidence and legal bases, considering the absence of discussion on the merits of the damages prayed for by the petitioners.