G.R. No. 120941 - De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals

In Civil Case No. 717 filed on April 15, 1988 before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, private respondents Isagani and Ignacio Raneses initiated an ejectment case against petitioner Nena de Guzman.
The complaint alleged that in 1986, petitioner unlawfully constructed a house on a 4.5-hectare lot owned by the private respondents in Labahan, San Mateo, Rizal—accomplishing the entry “by stealth.”

Despite receipt of two demand letters from the respondents, petitioner refused to vacate the premises.
On July 27, 1988, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on petitioner through her daughter, Nancy de Guzman, who was of sufficient age and discretion.
Petitioner failed to file her answer within the reglementary period, prompting the respondents to move for summary judgment.
On August 17, 1988, the Municipal Trial Court, through Judge Apolinar T. Antazo, rendered a default judgment ordering petitioner to vacate the disputed lot and to pay the respondents P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees along with the costs of suit.

The Municipal Trial Court issued a Writ of Execution on October 18, 1988.
Subsequently, on October 27, 1988, petitioner’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Set Aside the Decision, which was denied by the Municipal Trial Court.

On January 19, 1989, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Injunction, and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal (Civil Case No. 540-SM).
Petitioner contended that she was denied due process since the summons was not properly served, asserting that the deputy sheriff resorted to substituted service without making genuine efforts to locate her.
Additionally, she challenged the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court on the ground that the forcible entry case was filed two years after her alleged unlawful entry into the premises, thereby rendering the complaint untimely.
The Regional Trial Court, after considering the petition, ruled on July 10, 1992, that the service of summons was improper and that the forcible entry case was indeed filed out of time; however, after receiving evidence on property ownership, it ordered petitioner to vacate the lot because documentary proofs established the respondents’ title and ownership.

Within the reglementary period, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, arguing that:

The trial court erred in deciding the merits without issuing a prior order setting aside the Municipal Trial Court’s decision.
The trial court erred in not dismissing the forcible entry case (the principal action) after declaring it untimely and beyond the lower court’s jurisdiction.
The trial court erred in ruling on the issue of ownership by declaring that the respondents were the rightful owners of the property.

On January 24, 1995, the Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It held that:

Petitioner chose the wrong remedy, for her proper avenue was an appeal rather than a petition for relief from judgment—since there was no indication of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
Petitioner failed to prove any right or ownership over the lot because her predecessor-in-interest was merely a squatter.

Petitioner’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated June 27, 1995.

Petitioner elevated the case by filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Her assignments of error focused on:

The claim that she was denied due process due to improper service of summons.
The wrong remedy being employed and the trial court’s failure to dismiss an action that was filed out of time.
The substantive ruling on the ownership and possession of the property, which was allegedly not in accordance with law and precedent.

Whether petitioner was denied due process of law because the summons was improperly served.

The effectiveness of substituted service via her daughter and whether this method complied with procedural requirements.

Whether the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to try the forcible entry case given that it relied on substituted service without a proper demonstration of the impossibility of personal service.

The requirement that proof of impossibility be shown in the record to validate substituted service.

Whether the forcible entry case was lawfully instituted despite being filed two years after the alleged act of unlawful entry, thereby invoking the one-year prescription period.

The impact of the prescription period on the merits of a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action.

Whether the trial court erred in addressing both the procedural (service of summons) and substantive (ownership and possession) issues simultaneously without first setting aside the default judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.

The appropriateness of trying the merits of the case on the basis of timeliness and jurisdiction.

Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the judgment upholding the claim of ownership by the respondents, particularly when procedural lapses might have affected the outcome.