G.R. No. 80491 - De Dios vs. Court of Appeals

By Board Resolution No. 939B-82 (Dec. 28, 1982), Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) conveyed a parcel of land under conditional sale to Averdi Marketing and Development Corporation (“Averdi”).
In February 1983, petitioner J. Artie Vergel de Dios, as Averdi’s general manager, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and an Addendum, assigning his rights to private respondent Eduardo Lopingco, subject to conditions on downpayment, installment payments, and automatic deed of assignment upon fulfillment.

June 21, 1984: Lopingco filed a complaint in RTC Manila for revocation of PVB’s board resolution and rescission of his contract with de Dios; summons and copies served on both defendants.
July 6, 1984: PVB moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action and improper party.
July 13, 1984: Lopingco filed and served an amended complaint on de Dios by registered mail; on the same day, counsel for de Dios entered appearance and obtained a 10-day extension to file an answer.
August–December 1984: de Dios moved for a copy of the amended complaint; Lopingco opposed, citing earlier service. At hearing, the court deferred ruling on default until proof of service; on Dec. 6, postal certification showed de Dios received the amended complaint on July 17; de Dios was declared in default and evidence was taken ex parte.

April 30, 1985: RTC rendered judgment rescinding the agreements, ordering de Dios to refund P725,000 with interest, indemnify P140,000/year, pay actual and litigation damages, attorney’s fees and costs; PVB was dismissed.
June 5, 1985: de Dios moved for new trial, alleging lack of service and no negligence; denied on August 7.
August 30, 1985: de Dios appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the declaration of default and the judgment.
Petition for review on certiorari filed before the Supreme Court, raising procedural and substantive objections.

Whether the amended complaint required a new summons to be validly served.
Whether the default declaration and judgment by default deprived de Dios of due process.
Whether rescission was a proper remedy or if Lopingco’s sole recourse was contract reformation.
Whether the damages awarded were excessive or unsupported by evidence.