G.R. No. 73441 - NAESS Shipping Phil., Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Petitioner Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (DLPC) filed a complaint for damages against private respondent Francisco Tesorero before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 11 on April 10, 1992, docketed as CEB-11578, seeking damages of P11,000,000.00.
In lieu of an answer to the complaint, respondent raised a motion to dismiss on several grounds, including:

The most material ground raised by the respondent was that the venue was improperly laid.
The RTC, through its Resolution dated August 3, 1992, dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

The RTC held that the plaintiff, being a private corporation with its principal place of business allegedly in Banilad, Cebu City (as stated in the complaint), was considered a resident thereof for venue purposes.
The RTC referred to evidence provided by the respondent, specifically lease contracts with NAPOCOR, which indicated that the plaintiff’s principal office was at “163-165 P. Reyes Street, Davao City.”
The court noted that a representation in such contracts should bar the plaintiff from disputing its effective residence and that the choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff’s discretion or influenced by ulterior motives.
Consequently, the RTC found that the petitioner’s true principal office for venue purposes was in Davao City, leading to the dismissal of the case in Cebu City.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on October 1, 1992, which was ultimately denied.
On November 20, 1992, petitioner sought review by filing a petition on certiorari (initially docketed as G.R. No. 107381).
The case was referred to the Court of Appeals on January 11, 1993, and was docketed there as CA-G.R. SP No. 29996.
On August 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying due course to the petition and dismissing it, wherein counsel for petitioner received the decision on September 6, 1993.

That the appellate court denied procedural due process by not resolving one of the issues raised.
That the petitioner’s right to file its damages action in Cebu City (where it allegedly maintains its principal office based on its filings and paid docket fees) should not be negated by what the petitioner described as an improper estoppel, especially in the absence of a false statement made to or reliance by the private respondent.

Additionally, the issue turned on the distinction between venue and jurisdiction:

Jurisdiction is a matter that cannot be conferred or waived by the parties’ consent.
Venue, on the other hand, is fixed by statute and may be altered by the parties’ consent or by waiver of timely objection.

The petitioner cited the case of Young Auto Supply Co. v. Court of Appeals, where venue was similarly contested based on conflicting evidence regarding the corporate residence.
In that decision, the Court highlighted that for a corporation, its residence for venue purposes is normally deemed to be the location of its principal office as stated in its articles of incorporation.
It was noted that although a corporation may have branch offices elsewhere, its legal residence for the purpose of personal actions is determined by its principal office.
The evidence regarding DLPC’s corporate address was conflicting:

The complaint and the amended articles and by-laws pointed to Cebu City as its residence.
Conversely, contracts with NAPOCOR referenced an address in Davao City.

The respondent argued that the representations made by petitioner in contracts and judicial admissions amounted to an estoppel against claiming Cebu City as its residence for venue purposes, but there was no showing that the respondent had relied upon any such representations.

Whether the proper venue for filing the damage suit should be where the petitioner’s principal office is located, that is, Davao City as indicated by its contracts with NAPOCOR, or whether it remains in Cebu City as alleged in the complaint and supported by the petitioner’s amended corporate documents.

Whether petitioner is estopped from asserting Cebu City as its principal place of business given its prior representations:

A false statement made to the private respondent.
Evidence that the respondent had relied on the representation to its detriment or injury.

Whether the issues concerning venue (which can be waived or consented to by the parties) should affect the validity of a judgment, in contrast to jurisdiction (which is non-waivable and non-consentable).

Whether the failure of the Court of Appeals to address all issues presented by the petitioner, particularly regarding the venue dispute raised, amounted to a denial of procedural due process.