G.R. No. 74854 - Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, on March 22, 1983.
The complaint sought:

The annulment of two deeds of sale concerning a parcel of riceland located in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan.
The surrender of the produce yielded from the subject parcel.
Damages for the respondent’s refusal to have the deeds set aside upon demand.

Prior to serving a summons on private respondent Rufino de Guzman, on May 25, 1983, the RTC Executive Judge ordered petitioner’s counsel to confer with the trial judge regarding the question of venue.
Following the conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the venue was improperly laid, finding that:

The nature of petitioner’s action was “real” as it sought both the annulment of the deeds and the recovery of ownership of the land, which lay outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC in Antipolo.
Based on the allegations, the subject property being in Lingayen, Pangasinan, rendered the RTC an improper forum.

Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals), which in its decision on April 11, 1986, affirmed the dismissal.
In his petition for review, petitioner contended that:

The trial court committed an error by dismissing the complaint motu proprio for improper venue without giving the defendant an opportunity to challenge the venue.
The right to raise the issue of improper venue lies exclusively with the defendant, and venue, as a procedural matter, is subject to waiver by the parties.

Asserted that only the defendant should raise the issue of venue through a proper motion under the Rules of Court.
Emphasized that venue is procedural and waivable, and hence, premature dismissal by the trial court bypassed the defendant’s right to be heard.

Maintained that the complaint was a “real action” and that any court receiving such a case may determine, through judicial notice, that the venue is improper.
Contended that the court was not required to wait for the defendant to object, as the action clearly fell outside its territorial jurisdiction based on the location of the subject property pursuant to Rule 4, Section 2, Rule 4 of the New Rules of Court.

The trial court had the responsibility to ascertain not only its jurisdiction over the parties but also to ensure that the proper mode of service of summons was effected.
Despite petitioner’s claim that summons service had been attempted as early as April 28, 1963, evidence suggested that service might not have been properly effectuated, nor had the defendant appeared or answered.
The RTC should have directed petitioner to exhaust alternative modes of service (personal, substituted, or by publication) under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court before considering dismissal on venue grounds.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the complaint motu proprio on the ground of improper venue without giving the defendant the opportunity to raise the issue in a proper motion to dismiss?
Is the right to challenge improper venue exclusively that of the defendant, and can such an issue be waived if not timely raised?
Should the court have instead applied the procedural remedies provided by the Rules of Court (such as alternative modes of service and allowing the venue issue to be raised by the defendant) before dismissing the complaint outright?