G.R. No. 205573 - Cuan vs. Court of Appeals

In January 2009, private respondent Yolanda Mercado filed a petition for deallocation of a home lot originally awarded to Alejandro Lorenzo, later transferred to Helen Lorenzo Cunanan.
The petition was filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform-Regional Office No. III (DAR-R03).

On April 8, 2010, DAR-R03 issued an Order dismissing Mercado’s petition for reallocation due to lack of merit, specifically stating that the petition was unsubstantiated.
Mercado subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on May 13, 2010, arguing that Lorenzo and his heirs were absentee landlords.
On October 13, 2010, DAR-R03 granted Mercado’s motion for reconsideration, setting aside its previous dismissal and recommending cancellation of TCT No. 288509 in the name of Helen Lorenzo.
DAR-R03 then issued an Order of Finality on December 1, 2010, making the reconsideration order final and executory.

In April 2011, Cunanan inquired with the DAR Provincial Office regarding her home lot and learned of the issuance of the Order of Finality.
On May 13, 2011, she filed a Motion to Quash the Order of Finality and other orders, contending that she was not notified of the proceedings and was not afforded an opportunity to be heard, thus alleging a violation of her due process rights.
On June 13, 2011, Cunanan filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment pertaining to the Order of Finality, asserting that she learned of the decision only on April 14, 2011, and that she had substantial defenses which would support her claim to the property.
The following day, June 14, 2011, she filed a Petition for Injunction and Prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals (CA) to stop the cancellation of TCT No. 288509 and the transfer of the property to Mercado.

On September 26, 2011, the CA dismissed Cunanan’s petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction for failure to comply with procedural rules (non-payment of fees, lack of submission of service proofs, etc.).
On February 8, 2012, Cunanan received the formal Entry of Judgment certifying the dismissal, and the DAR-R03 later received notice of the CA resolution attaining finality.
On March 9, 2012, DAR-R03 dismissed her motion to quash the Order of Finality and her petition for relief from judgment as moot and academic, followed by a denial of her motion for reconsideration on April 9, 2012.

Aggrieved by the decisions of both DAR-R03 and the CA, Cunanan filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that the technical rules were improperly applied and that she was denied her constitutional right to due process because she was not notified or afforded an opportunity to be heard.
On July 31, 2012, the CA dismissed her petition for certiorari on the ground that the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 45, and that her petition for certiorari was filed out of time.
Cunanan then filed a motion for reconsideration on August 31, 2012, asserting she met the timely filing requirement and reinforcing her claim of due process violation.
Finally, on November 26, 2012, the CA denied her motion for reconsideration.

Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper and available remedy for Cunanan’s claims regarding the alleged judicial and quasi-judicial errors committed by DAR-R03 and the CA.
The contention between using a petition for certiorari versus a petition for review under Rule 45 as the correct avenue for addressing the alleged violations.

Whether Cunanan was denied due process of law in that she was not furnished with copies of pleadings, notices of hearings, or any form of service during the proceedings related to Mercado’s petition for reallocation.
Whether the denial of notice and an opportunity to be heard rendered all the orders and proceedings null and void.

Whether the CA’s dismissal of Cunanan’s petition for certiorari and her subsequent motion for reconsideration, on the basis of technicalities, amounts to a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether the results of such technical dismissals justify the intervention of the Court in vacating the impugned orders.