A.M. No. P-00-1381, P-00-1382 - Mallare vs. Ferry

An Act of the Philippine Legislature, Act No. 3239, was approved on November 27, 1925, authorizing the creation of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili in Cebu for the care and support of indigent, incapacitated, and helpless persons.
The Act provided that the institution, endowed with real and personal property, would be organized as a corporation with defined powers, duties, and succession rules as determined by the legislative act.
The Hospicio was expressly granted privileges such as exemption from various taxes and special conditions regarding its operation, including the maintenance of scholarships and the operation of a pharmacy.

Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui, the founders, executed a deed of donation on January 2, 1926, transferring a substantial amount of personal and real property (fifteen parcels of land and personal property) to the Hospicio under specified conditions.
The deed of donation included detailed stipulations regarding the administration of the Hospicio during the donors’ lifetime and after their death or incapacity, notably providing for a succession scheme involving their nephews and other specified persons, as well as conditions for removal in cases of maladministration or incapacity.
Subsequent deeds of donation were executed on March 1, 1926 by Pedro and on the same date by Benigna to donate additional properties with similar terms, except for an additional provision providing a monthly pension to Pedro.

The administration of the Hospicio was initially carried out by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui. Pedro died on June 4, 1926, and Benigna continued until her death on March 22, 1929.
Following their deaths, Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem jointly assumed administration until Mauricio died on May 8, 1931; thereafter, Dionisio became the sole administrator until his death on July 1, 1931.
On July 2, 1931, Teodoro Cui allegedly usurped the office of administrator without legal justification, and he continued to exercise the office despite competing claims.

On January 26, 1932, Jesus Ma. Cui (plaintiff and appellant) filed a complaint in quo warranto against Teodoro Cui (defendant and appellee), challenging his unauthorized assumption of the administrative office and invoking the conditions and succession rules outlined in the donation deeds and Act No. 3239.
The complaint contained three causes of action: (a) alleging usurpation of the office contrary to the donor’s stipulations, (b) asserting that Teodoro Cui was inept due to excessive alcoholism and maladministration, and (c) requesting the delivery of the administration to the plaintiff.
Mariano Cui (intervenor and appellant) later filed a complaint in intervention, contending his right to be the administrator based on the prescribed succession order, and alleging that Teodoro Cui had unlawfully prevented him from assuming his rightful post.
The defendant filed demurrers on procedural and substantive grounds, alleging that the plaintiff lacked legal capacity to sue and that only the provincial fiscal under the statute had the authority to institute such action.

Whether the office of administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, which is governed by a special legislative act and is executed under detailed donation conditions, qualifies as a public office within the meaning of Section 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Whether a corporation created by a special act, as opposed to one organized under the general Corporation Law, may be directly subject to a quo warranto action brought by an individual.

Whether private individuals who claim an interest in the administration of the Hospicio (such as Jesus Ma. Cui and Mariano Cui) are entitled to commence a quo warranto proceeding against Teodoro Cui without the intervention of the Attorney-General or provincial fiscal.
How the stipulated procedural requirements in the deed of donation (particularly paragraph 3 concerning removal based on maladministration) interact with the public character of the office for purposes of quo warranto.

Whether the elimination of the donors’ heirs and the specific succession rules established in the donation deeds confer an inherent right upon the intervening parties (the nephews and their descendants) to assume the office, thereby justifying the action against the defendant’s alleged usurpation.
The implication of divergent administrative practices (joint versus individual administration) in determining who is legitimately entitled to occupy the office.