G.R. No. L-21286 - Cruz vs. Government Service Insurance System

Petitioner, Filemon Cruz, was employed as a clerk expediter in the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) since 1951.
In July 1960, the GSIS initiated administrative charges against him for “misconduct or dishonesty” and imposed a preventive suspension effective that same month.

On August 23, 1960, before the expiration of the 60‑day preventive suspension period, the GSIS opted to file a criminal complaint (I.S. No. 60‑25705) in the City Fiscal’s Office in Manila, alleging estafa through the falsification of commercial and public documents.
Subsequent to the filing, on July 17, 1961, corresponding information was submitted before the Court of First Instance of Manila.
On July 28, 1962, the Manila Court dismissed this information on the ground that, upon reinvestigation, there was no connection between petitioner and the case.

Petitioner claimed the existence of another pending criminal case in Bulacan; however, this case was dismissed on February 5, 1963, with an order (later modified) purportedly favoring his reinstatement with back pay.
Petitioner sent letters on February 6 and February 12, 1963, to the GSIS requesting his immediate reinstatement, highlighting the dismissal of the Bulacan case, but his request was denied by the GSIS.

Contrary to petitioner’s assertions of a mere preventive suspension, the GSIS actually conducted formal administrative proceedings.
A 3‑member Special Board of Inquiry was convened to investigate the charges against him.

Both the prosecution and the defense presented evidence, including testimonies and documentary exhibits related to the fraudulent encashment of a GSIS check.
The key incident involved a check taken from the Life Insurance Claims Division on the afternoon of July 6, 1960, which was later encashed fraudulently.
Testimony from Rodolfo Buzon established that petitioner had passed the check to him, thereby connecting petitioner with the fraudulent act.

The Special Board found petitioner's actions to be indicative of dishonesty and acts prejudicial to the best interests of the service.
Based on these findings, the Board recommended that petitioner be considered as having resigned with prejudice to reinstatement, effective as of his preventive suspension date.
The GSIS Board of Trustees approved this recommendation through Resolution No. 956 on March 15, 1961, and communicated his separation via letters on March 17 and April 7, 1961.

In his verified petition filed on May 15, 1963, petitioner argued that his continuous suspension equated to unlawful exclusion from service and that he had been deprived of due process because he was not given an opportunity to defend himself adequately.
Petitioner and his counsel, however, suppressed material facts regarding his administrative hearing and the confirmed separation from service.
The petition falsely portrayed his status as “under continuous suspension” rather than recognizing his formal separation as determined by due administrative process.

The GSIS, in its documented Answer, presented records that were later admitted by petitioner, affirming that he had been duly heard and represented during the administrative proceedings.
Documents showed that the administrative case and the criminal cases were distinct, with the former conclusively resulting in his separation from service.
The official correspondence from the GSIS reiterated that petitioner was no longer an employee, confirming the decision rendered in Resolution No. 956.

The Court criticized petitioner’s counsel for failing to disclose all material facts, thereby misleading the Court.
The failure to exhibit truth and candor was highlighted as detrimental to the proper administration of justice.
This omission led to the imposition of treble costs on petitioner and his counsel, emphasizing the high standard required of those appearing before the Court.

Whether petitioner’s claim of being “under continuous suspension” could be equated to an unlawful exclusion from service.
Whether his administrative case, which culminated in a formal separation from service, left any legal basis for reinstatement through a writ of mandamus.

Whether petitioner was denied his right to due process by not being afforded the opportunity to adequately defend himself, contrary to his allegations.
Examination of whether the administrative proceedings were conducted following proper hearing and representation, as evidenced by the record.

The effect of concealing the true facts and misrepresenting the status of his employment on the merits of his petition.
Whether the deliberate omission of material facts by petitioner and his counsel, thereby attempting to create a false impression, warrants judicial sanction.

Whether the counsel’s failure to exhibit candor and full disclosure before the Court justifies imposing treble costs.
The extent to which such misrepresentations undermine the integrity of the judicial process.