G.R. No. L-14352 - Confesor vs. Pelayo

On March 29, 1952, respondents (Deogracias Umadhay, et al.) filed an action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo concerning a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3570 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo.
Petitioners, being the heirs of Juan Hingco, contested the partition by asserting that they were the absolute and exclusive owners of the entire land.

The trial court rejected petitioners’ claim of exclusive ownership and subsequently ordered that the land be partitioned equally between the respondents and petitioners.
To implement the partition order, the court appointed a commissioner who was charged with the task of effecting the partition and submitted two plans:

Plan No. 1 – the subdivision scheme proposed by respondents.
Plan No. 2 – the subdivision scheme proposed by petitioners, wherein both plans would allocate an equal area to each party, but differed as to which specific lot was to be awarded to respondents.

The trial court’s decision stated: “Lot No. 1 is hereby adjudicated to plaintiffs (respondents) who may in turn divide it by and among themselves. Lot No. 2 is hereby adjudicated to defendants (petitioners) who may likewise divide it by and among themselves.”

Petitioners elevated the issue through an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto.
After the decision became final, the trial court, upon a petition by respondents, issued a writ of execution directing that respondents be placed in possession of the adjudicated portion of the property.

Petitioners objected vigorously to the trial court’s order on the ground that the dispositive parts of the decisions (both at the trial level and from the Court of Appeals) were silent regarding the delivery of possession to either party.
They contended that by adding a mandate for possession in the writ of execution, the trial court had amended the judgment by introducing new matter not provided for in the original decree.
Petitioners also argued that they had substantial improvements on the lot—namely, a house constructed with strong materials and standing crops—implying that any forced delivery of possession without indemnity for these improvements was inequitable.

The trial court justified its issuance of the writ of execution by stating that under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, once the commissioner’s partition report is approved, a special proceeding for possession is unnecessary.
The court emphasized that the purpose of partition is to sever the co-ownership by vesting in each party a sole and distinct interest in the property, thereby requiring the delivery of the property as an indispensable incident to the partition decree.
The order referenced Section 3 and Section 4 of Rule 71, under which the commissioner had examined the real estate and duly considered the improvements, thereby ensuring an equitable division.

Whether the trial court erred in ordering placement in possession of the property to the respondents through a writ of execution, considering that the original partition judgment was silent on the issue of possession.
Whether the commissioner, in submitting two competing partition plans and weighing the improvements present on the property, fulfilled his duty under Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Whether it is proper, in an action for partition, to infer the delivery of possession as an inherent incident to the partition, even in the absence of explicit judicial pronouncement in the dispositive part of the judgment.
Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding costs to respondents, especially given petitioners’ claims of having incurred significant expenses regarding improvements on the property.