G.R. No. L-34030 - Commissioner of Immigration vs. Vamenta, Jr.

The petitioner, the Commissioner of Immigration, became involved in litigation arising from the pending administrative application of respondent Anabella Imperial Uy.
Respondent Uy, a Chinese citizen who had duly elected Philippine citizenship by reaching the age of majority, had filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Branch III.
Her petition essentially sought that the respondent Commissioner of Immigration be compelled to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and to issue a certificate declaring her a Filipino citizen “for all intents and purposes.”

Respondent Uy had filed her petition with the Bureau of Immigration on July 19, 1968, requesting the election of Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of Art. IV, Section IV of the 1987 Constitution (as applicable under the 1935/1940 regime in context) and Commonwealth Act No. 625.
Despite the filing, no action was taken by the Commissioner for over two years, a delay which Uy argued had materially affected her, particularly because she needed her citizenship certificate for processing her passport for studies abroad in the United States.

Petitioner’s (Commissioner of Immigration’s) Contentions and Motion to Dismiss

On September 29, 1970, the petitioner moved to dismiss Uy’s petition for mandamus on the ground that:

Under current legislation, there could be no judicial action for declaring an individual’s citizenship, as established in earlier cases (e.g., Republic vs. Maddela).
The act of electing Philippine citizenship, complete with the oath of allegiance, rendered the alien certificate of registration functus officio, thereby obviating the need for its cancellation or the issuance of an additional identification certificate.

The petitioner further argued that pursuant to a reversal of administrative policy—evidenced by the Secretary of Justice’s circular of September 7, 1970—the respondent could still file an application for cancellation of alien registration with the Bureau of Immigration.
It was also stressed that respondent Uy had not yet exhausted all available administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention.

Uy contended that her suit was properly a petition for mandamus that sought the prompt action by the Commissioner to decide on her citizenship application that had been pending since 1968.
She argued that the Commissioner had a legal duty to act on her application and that his inaction had caused her undue delay, which was particularly critical given her imminent plans to leave for further studies in the United States.
Uy maintained that the principles distinguishing her case from the Maddela case were substantial, as she was not asking for a judicial declaration of citizenship but simply for the administrative processing of her duly filed application.
She further noted that even if a declaration of citizenship was prayed for, it was based on an earlier circular (June 13, 1970) which had subsequently been reversed, thereby complicating the administrative posture of the case.

The trial court had initially ruled that respondent Uy had not exhausted all administrative remedies available to her, particularly by not having approached the Secretary of Justice regarding the undue delay.
The non-exhaustion of administrative remedies was seen not as a jurisdictional defect but as a failure to state a proper cause of action for mandamus.
Despite the contention, the trial court exercised its discretion, and the issue of exhaustion was deliberated along with the proper functions and ministerial duties of the Commissioner.

Whether respondent Uy’s petition for mandamus could proceed despite her failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies, particularly by not seeking recourse with the Secretary of Justice regarding the delay in processing her citizenship application.

Whether the action for mandamus is proper given that the petitioner (Commissioner of Immigration) argued that:

The administrative process for cancellation of alien registration was adequate and available, and
There existed legal precedents (e.g., Republic vs. Maddela) indicating that an action for judicial declaration of citizenship is not permitted under the existing legislation.

Whether the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies should affect the court’s jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus or merely constitute a defect in stating a viable cause of action.