A.C. No. 12768 - Bondoc vs. Licudine

The petitioner-appellant is the City of Ozamiz, represented by its City Mayor, Municipal Board, City Treasurer, and City Auditor.
The respondent-appellee is Serapio S. Lumapas, an operator of transportation buses (operating under the name Romar Line) with terminals in Ozamiz City and Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, operating pursuant to a certificate of public convenience issued by the Public Service Commission.
The controversy also involves the lower court’s involvement, where Judge Geronimo R. Marave of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered the decision later appealed.

On September 15, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ozamiz City enacted Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964, which imposed parking fees on every motor vehicle parked on any portion of the designated parking area.
Key features of Ordinance No. 466 included:

A definition of “motor vehicles” to cover all vehicles run by engine regardless of whether they are used for passengers or cargo.
The term “parking” was defined as the stoppage of any motor vehicle on designated parking spaces for the purpose of loading and unloading passengers or cargo.
A specific schedule of fees was provided, differing for passenger vehicles (e.g., passenger buses, pick-ups, jeepneys) and for cargo vehicles (e.g., cargo trucks, similar vehicles).
The City Treasurer (or his authorized representative) was empowered to collect such fees and issue official receipts.
Penalties were prescribed for violators, including imprisonment or a fine.

After the ordinance’s approval, the City of Ozamiz began collecting the prescribed parking fees from Serapio S. Lumapas.

From October 1964 to January 1967, Lumapas paid fees under protest, amounting to an aggregate of P1,259.00 (with official receipts issued).
The fees were charged at One Peso per unit per day, with a schedule that varied according to vehicle type.

On January 11, 1968, Lumapas filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, alleging the ordinance was ultra vires and seeking:

A declaration that Ordinance No. 466 was null and void.
An order for the reimbursement of P1,243.00 (the actual amount collected) plus additional sums as attorney’s fees.

The petitioner’s answer filed on January 25, 1968, containing its affirmative defenses.
A reply by the respondent-appellee on January 30, 1968.
A joint stipulation of facts filed on January 3, 1969, which detailed the layout of the market site and the designated parking area, the collection of fees, correspondences between the parties regarding reimbursement, and the factual background regarding the use of Zulueta Street and its municipal characterization.

The lower court, after an ocular inspection and reviewing the stipulation of facts (which referenced a prior Ordinance No. 286, series of 1956), rendered judgment on March 18, 1969.

The Court of First Instance declared the ordinance null and void.
It characterized the parking fee as in the nature of toll fees for public road use, thus requiring presidential approval under Section 59(b) of Republic Act No. 4136 (the Land Transportation and Traffic Code).

Declaring Ordinance No. 466 null and void.
Interpreting the fees as toll fees rather than parking fees.
Determining that the parking area was a public street rather than patrimonial property of the City.
Ordering the reimbursement of fees to respondent Lumapas.

The fees were for the rental use of parking spaces owned by the City, as evidenced by a Tax Declaration.
The Municipal Board’s power to regulate street use (under Section 15(y) of the City Charter and Section 2308(f) of the Revised Administrative Code) empowered it to impose such fees.
The ordinance was intended to decongest traffic, enhance safety, and ensure an orderly system for passenger and cargo handling.

In a later manifestation dated November 27, 1969, and supported by subsequent indorsements and approvals (including that of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Public Works), the petitioner reiterated that the ordinance was valid and properly enacted.

Whether the Municipal Board of the City of Ozamiz was empowered by law to enact Ordinance No. 466 imposing parking fees.
Whether the ordinance falls within the delegation of police power to regulate public streets and manage municipal property.

Whether the fees imposed were properly characterized as parking fees for the use of city-owned parking areas (patrimonial property) or should be considered toll fees for the use of public roads.
The implications of such characterization under Section 59(b) of Republic Act No. 4136, which requires presidential approval for toll fees.

Whether the area designated for parking—part of or adjacent to the public market—is to be considered as patrimonial property of the City or as property for public use.
The effect of the property classification on the City’s ability to levy fees for its use.

Whether it was proper for the lower court to order reimbursement of the parking fees collected from respondent Lumapas.
The legitimacy of the ordinance’s enactment in view of subsequent presidential approval and the corresponding administrative and legislative endorsements.