G.R. No. L-25134 - City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

On February 17, 1949, the Bacolod City Council enacted Ordinance No. 66, imposing on manufacturers and bottlers of soft drinks a fee of one‐twenty‐fourth (1/24) of a centavo per bottle, with a provision for a 2% monthly surcharge (capped at 24% for one year) for delinquent payments.
In 1959, Ordinance No. 150 amended the fee, increasing it to one‐eighth (1/8) of a centavo per bottle (effectively raising the fee from approximately P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft drinks).

On March 23, 1960, the City of Bacolod (appellee) filed a complaint in Civil Case No. 5693 against San Miguel Brewery, Inc. (appellant) for the recovery of bottling taxes.
The complaint specifically demanded payment of the basic bottling tax at 3 centavos per case as established under the ordinances, omitting any reference to the surcharges for delinquency.
A stipulation of facts between the parties followed, and on November 12, 1960, the trial court rendered judgment ordering San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to pay the amount corresponding to the basic charges (P26,306.54 plus interest).

After the initial decision became final, the City sought to include the surcharges, as provided under Section 4 of the ordinances.
The appellee made a motion for reconsideration in the already decided case to include these surcharges, but that motion was denied on the basis that the decision was final and not subject to amendment.
On July 10, 1964, the City of Bacolod filed a second complaint (Civil Case No. 7355) to recover surcharges amounting to P36,519.10 for the period from August 1959 to December 1962.
The second complaint reiterated that the surcharges owed were a consequence of the same act of non-payment that initially led to the recovery action for the basic charges.

San Miguel Brewery, Inc. (appellant) answered the second complaint and defended the action on two main grounds:

That a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
That the action for surcharges is barred by the prior judgment in the first suit, as it amounts to an impermissible splitting of one single cause of action.

The trial court, after considering the pleadings and motions, rendered judgment on March 11, 1965, ordering the payment of the surcharges.
Appellant moved for reconsideration of the judgment, but the motion was denied, leading to the instant appeal.

Whether the filing of separate complaints for different reliefs (basic charges and surcharges) arising from the same act of non-payment constitutes an impermissible splitting of a single cause of action.

Is it proper for a plaintiff (City of Bacolod) to file a subsequent suit for surcharges when the first suit for the basic charges did not include those surcharges?
Does the prior judgment on the basic charges bar recovery of the surcharges under the doctrines of litis pendentia and res judicata, as a consequence of splitting up the single cause of action?