G.R. No. 159302 - Citibank, N.A. vs. National Labor Relations Commission

CITIBANK, N.A. is the petitioner in the case.
The respondents are the National Labor Relations Commission and Rosita Tan Paragas.

The respondent filed a Motion for Leave to Admit an Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration (MR) and a Second MR, both dated July 22, 2008.
The respondent argued that she only became aware of the Resolution dated April 23, 2008—which denied her earlier motion for reconsideration—when she inquired about her case status on July 9, 2008, through the Judicial Records Section of the Court.
She admitted that a copy of the said Resolution was sent to her counsel, the Law Firm of M.M. Lazaro & Associates, with whom she had not been in communication since filing her earlier motion, justifying her inaction on account of a pro bono arrangement and personal considerations.

Court records showed that the respondent’s counsel actually received notice of the April 23, 2008 Resolution on June 5, 2008.
The principle that notice to the counsel amounts to notice to the client was applied, given the absence of any withdrawal or substitution of counsel from the respondent’s side.
The timing of the receipt of notice by counsel set the reglementary period, meaning any subsequent filings by the respondent were subject to being scrutinized for timeliness.

The respondent’s Motion for Leave to Admit and Second MR were filed well outside the prescribed reglementary period.
The Court previously granted a second Motion for Reconsideration to the petitioner in a similar context (Resolution dated August 17, 2005), highlighting that procedural and timing rules are strictly enforced unless extraordinarily persuasive reasons are shown.

The respondent contended that a second motion for reconsideration should be allowed, citing that:

Paragraph 7.1: The petitioner’s second motion for extension of time and its petition for review on certiorari had been finally denied in a Resolution dated January 14, 2004.
Paragraph 7.2: Her private claim for retirement benefits had been already included in her position paper.
Paragraph 7.3: Findings of serious misconduct were absent in both the Labor Arbiter’s Decision (dated June 29, 1998) and the NLRC Resolution (dated October 24, 2004).
Paragraph 7.4: The petitioner had allegedly failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Procedure, Revised Circular No. 1-88, and Supreme Court Circular No. 19-91.
Paragraph 7.5: The petitioner’s counsel initially omitted his attorney’s Roll Number in court filings, contravening Bar Matter No. 1132 of the Supreme Court.

The respondent argued that even though second motions for reconsideration are generally prohibited, such prohibition could be relaxed in the interest of justice if persuasive reasons are presented.

The Court had in a prior Resolution (dated August 17, 2005) already allowed a second MR for the petitioner based on extraordinarily persuasive reasons and the transient nature of procedural technicalities.
The Court’s prior decision emphasized that the merits of a case outweigh formalities when the ends of substantial justice are at stake.

Whether the notice sent to the respondent’s counsel is sufficient to constitute notice to the respondent herself, in light of her claim of not being directly informed.

Does the presumption of effective representation hold absent any notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel?

Whether the respondent’s Motion for Leave to Admit and her Second Motion for Reconsideration, filed out of time, can be allowed under the provisions for relaxing technical rules in the interest of justice.

Can the respondent’s explanation of non-communication and pro bono arrangement be considered a valid excuse for the untimely filing?

Whether the procedural defects raised by the respondent (including deficiencies related to compliance with Section 3, Rule 45 and failure to indicate the attorney’s Roll Number) justify a reconsideration of the previously denied motion.

Are these alleged technical lapses substantial enough to warrant a departure from the strict timeliness rule?

Whether the prohibition against second motions for reconsideration is absolute or can be relaxed when overriding public interest and substantial justice are at stake.

What criteria may allow for the relaxation of this prohibition, and did the respondent meet such criteria?