G.R. No. 262938 - Walter Manuel F. Prescott vs. Bureau of Immigration, as represented by Hon. Rogelio D. Gevero, Jr. and the Department of Justice

The case involves the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary (petitioner) and respondents Sabungan Bagong Silang, Inc., its president Artemio Paguia, and the Hon. Guillermo Torres, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII (Pasig).
The petitioner initiated an original action for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to set aside an order issued by Judge Torres which, among other things, resulted in an ex-parte restraining order affecting the petitioner’s conduct.

On January 24, 1963, the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1963.
The Ordinance contained several key provisions:

Section I prohibited cockfighting or pintakasi except in licensed cockpits.
Section II prohibited holding cockfights on days not authorized by law or statute, except when conducted for charitable purposes, subject to the discretion of the Municipal Mayor and limited to one day per week per licensed cockpit, with possible extension from daytime to nighttime.
Section III repealed any previous resolutions or ordinances inconsistent with the new ordinance.
Sections IV and V prescribed penalties for violations and provided that the ordinance takes effect upon approval.

On or about January 30, 1963, Sabungan Bagong Silang, Inc. filed Civil Case No. 7544 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The complaint alleged that:

The Corporation operated a duly licensed cockpit in Mandaluyong.
Permits issued by the Municipal Mayor allowed the operation of cockfights on Wednesdays.
The petitioner was threatening to disrupt the lawful cockfights and prosecute the Corporation and its agents despite the authorized permits.
Such actions by the petitioner were characterized as unjustified, improper, illegal, and an abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction.

The Corporation requested a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner and his agents from interfering with the cockfights permitted for charitable purposes.
On January 30, 1963, the respondent Judge issued a restraining order against the petitioner and set the preliminary injunction for hearing on February 12, 1963.
The petitioner filed an answer to the complaint, raising special affirmative defenses that included:

Subsequent hearings for the issuance of the preliminary injunction were repeatedly postponed on various dates (February 23, March 19, June 5, and July 24, 1963), despite the petitioner’s objection alleging delay.

On July 22, 1963, the petitioner moved to have his motion to dismiss and special defenses considered as the only issue in the case was one of law, given the delays.
The respondent Judge did not act on this motion.
On February 18, 1964, the petitioner filed another motion to lift the restraining order, which again was not acted upon timely.
The petitioner eventually filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition on March 19, 1964, asserting that:

He had exhausted available remedies.
The 15-month ex-parte restraining order was without a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was subsequently issued on March 23, 1964, which was later made permanent.

The petitioner highlighted that as early as May 30, 1961, in Quimsing vs. Lachica (112 Phil. 110), this Court had declared similar ordinances (from the Municipality of Molo, Iloilo) as void for violating Sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The petitioner contended that the provisions of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, though supported by Republic Act No. 979 (previously Republic Act No. 938), should similarly be invalidated.

Was the respondent Judge’s repeated and unexplained delay in addressing motions and issues an abuse of discretion amounting to a lack (or excess) of jurisdiction?
Did the inaction and postponement of hearings on the writ of preliminary injunction amount to a grave abuse of judicial discretion?

Is Municipal Ordinance No. 1 of Mandaluyong valid in light of its provisions regulating cockfighting, especially when compared with the earlier decision in Quimsing vs. Lachica?
Does the ordinance’s provision, which allows cockfights for charitable purposes under limited conditions, stand as legally permissible under Republic Act No. 979?

In the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the regular course of law, was the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction justified?
Is there any alternative remedy available to the petitioner that would have obviated the need for this extraordinary writ?