G.R. No. 196045 - People vs. Pastrana

On June 18, 1930, Basilio Carino, the plaintiff, applied for a license to open a cockpit in the village of Calindagan, within the jurisdiction of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros.
He tendered a sum totalling P500, which comprised P450 as required by the applicable municipal ordinance and an additional P50 as internal revenue tax.
The defendant, Arseno Jamoralne, municipal treasurer of Dumaguete, refused to accept the payment and hence refused to issue the license.

The plaintiff contended that he had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of the license.
The defendant responded with a twofold defense:

The plaintiff lacked a legal basis to compel the issuance of the license because no law or ordinance empowered the issuance in the manner applied for.
The ordinance cited by the plaintiff had been disapproved by a competent authority, rendering it never in force.

Municipal Ordinance No. 207 (enacted December 13, 1927) authorized the opening of cockpits in Dumaguete upon payment of a tax of P2,400 in the town and P1,200 in the barrio. This ordinance received provincial board approval on February 10, 1928.
Municipal Ordinance No. 226 (approved December 3, 1929) was enacted by a pro tempore municipal council during the suspension of several officials, amending the earlier ordinance by fixing the yearly tax for cockpits outside the town at P6,200. The provincial board approved this ordinance on December 13, 1929.
Upon the reinstatement of municipal officials, a new ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 236, was enacted by the municipal council, reducing the tax from P6,200 to P1,800 per year.
On December 27, 1929, the provincial board disapproved Ordinance No. 236 on the grounds that it was “contrary to the policy of the central government.”
An appeal was made by the municipal council from the provincial board’s ruling to the Chief of the Executive Bureau. The Chief dismissed the appeal on April 30, 1930.

Section 2243 of the Administrative Code, which confers upon municipal councils the power to regulate cockpits, cockfighting, and related activities, was the basis for the council’s legislative power in this matter.
Section 2233 of the Administrative Code empowers the provincial board to examine municipal resolutions, ordinances, and orders, and to declare them invalid if they exceed the scope of authority conferred upon the municipal councils.
Section 2236 of the Administrative Code reiterates that judicial tribunals retain the power to review the validity of municipal proceedings and to declare any act void for want of statutory authority, independent of administrative decisions.

Evidence and testimony, including that of municipal president Jose Teves, indicated that the rationale behind enacting Ordinance No. 236 was twofold:

To prevent the emergence of clandestine cockpits, which could arise from a strict policy of elimination, and
To maintain a source of municipal revenue from a well-established cockpit vice.

The municipal council’s decision to lower the tax from P6,200 to P1,800 was a discretionary exercise aimed at addressing local conditions and sustaining revenue, without contravening the minimum fee of P200 prescribed by law.

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis that the issue of the ordinance’s validity had already been decided administratively by the Chief of the Executive Bureau.
Whether judicial review is proper under Section 2236 of the Administrative Code, despite the prior ruling of the executive authorities.

Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 236, enacted to reduce the cockpit license tax from P6,200 to P1,800, falls within the legislative discretion granted to the municipal council by Section 2243 of the Administrative Code.
Whether the ordinance is contrary to the policy of the central government, as contended by the defendant, or if it was a proper exercise of local legislative power.

Whether the provincial board of Oriental Negros had the authority to declare the ordinance invalid solely on the ground that it was “contrary to the policy of the central government” rather than being beyond the powers conferred upon the municipal council.

Whether the proper recourse for the plaintiff was a writ of mandamus to compel the municipal treasurer to accept the license fee and issue the proper license in accordance with the law.