G.R. No. 200894 - Canlas vs. Republic

On August 22, 2006, petitioner Luzviminda A. Canlas filed an application for the original registration of title under Presidential Decree No. 1529 for a 9,751‑square‑meter parcel of land.
The property is located in Barangay Macamot, Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, and is technically described as Cadastral Lot No. 11566, Psu‑04‑006561.
The application was unopposed at the trial level as the Republic of the Philippines did not submit any comment or opposition despite being given the opportunity.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the application for registration, holding that petitioner had complied with both procedural and substantive requirements.
The RTC found that petitioner, through her predecessors‑in‑interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years.
Acts such as farming, tax payments, cultivation, and even making necessary corrections in public documents were noted as evidence of possession.
The RTC ordered the Register of Deeds to register the land in the petitioner’s name, subject to an easement for public use.

The Republic of the Philippines appealed the RTC decision by filing a notice of appeal on February 29, 2008.
Acting on the Republic’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that petitioner failed to prove the requisite open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession.
The appellate court noted inconsistencies in petitioner’s testimony during cross‑examination—especially regarding her residency and contradictory statements concerning mortgages or encumbrances.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's application for registration of title and denied her subsequent motion for reconsideration filed on December 7, 2011.

Petitioner argued that she had met the burden of showing possession by presenting documentary evidence (including multiple tax declarations) and witness testimonies regarding her family’s continuous cultivation and maintenance of the property since the early 1900s.
She asserted that residence was not synonymous with possession and that the law did not require her physical presence on the land.
A later‑presented document from the Land Registration Authority (LRA)—reporting on matters related to Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M‑00861 and indicating the waiver of rights by bona fide occupants—was introduced to bolster her claim.
In effect, petitioner shifted her theory from an application for original registration to seeking a judicial declaration of an indefeasible registrable title based on the long‑standing possession.

The legal basis for the application is grounded on Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which requires that an applicant demonstrate that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable public domain and that possession has been open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Relevant jurisprudence and statutory provisions, such as Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, were examined to clarify the differences between acquisition by possession and by prescription.
Landmark cases like Heirs of Mario Malabanan and Republic v. Gielczyk were cited for delineating the requisite acts of dominion over the land and the evidentiary requirements to prove such possession.

Both documentary evidence (e.g., various tax declarations and official reports) and witness testimonies established the long‑term, adverse, and continuous acts of possession by petitioner and her predecessors‑in‑interest.
The petitioner's evidence was contrasted with the Court of Appeals’ findings, which focused on alleged inconsistencies and the absence of demonstrable exclusive occupation.
The Supreme Court was tasked with reconciling the trial court’s favorable findings with the appellate court’s reversal, particularly on the issues of possession and the proper inclusion of the land in TCT No. 23377.

Whether petitioner Luzviminda A. Canlas has proven that she, through her predecessors‑in‑interest, maintained open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the 9,751‑square‑meter parcel of land.
Whether the acts of cultivation, tax payments, and declarations submitted by petitioner are adequate to meet the statutory requirements under Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529.

Whether the land described in plan Psu‑04‑006561 is properly included in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 23377 as claimed by petitioner.
Whether the Land Registration Authority’s report and motion regarding the waiver by bona fide occupants affect the petitioner’s claim to the property.

Whether petitioner's shift from seeking original registration to a declaration of an indefeasible right to title, in light of supplementary evidence, is procedurally and substantively permissible.
Whether any late‑filed evidence and the change in theory should be given due consideration without prejudicing due process.

Whether the findings of the trial court regarding evidence of possession should prevail over the Court of Appeals’ conclusions, particularly since the appraisal of evidence is largely a factual determination best made by the trial court.
Whether the issues not adequately addressed or raised at the lower court should be considered on appeal.