G.R. No. L-17786 - Cabili vs. Badelles

In the November 10, 1959 elections for city mayor of Iligan City, Mariano Ll. Badelles and Camilo P. Cabili were rival candidates.
Cabili was proclaimed elected and assumed office, replacing incumbent Badelles.
Badelles challenged Cabili’s electoral victory by filing a quo warranto petition in Civil Case No. 288 before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, contending that Cabili did not meet the statutory residency requirement of being a resident of Iligan City for at least one year prior to the election.

Badelles was represented by the law firm of San Juan, Africa and Benedieto with Attorney Jose L. Africa designated as the senior counsel.
At the initial hearing, Attorney Africa formally requested that all pleadings, notices, orders, and other papers be served exclusively at his office at 480 Padre Faura St., Manila, stating that service to any other address would not be acceptable.
The court took note of this request, thereby establishing a procedural requirement for service through the counsel’s office.

Trial proceedings culminated in a decision entered by the lower court on December 19, 1959, which dismissed Badelles’ petition.
A copy of the decision was dispatched by registered air mail on December 24, 1959, and was received by the Africa Law Office (Badelles’ counsel) at their Manila address on January 4, 1960.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1959, Badelles, then in Iligan City, requested and was furnished a copy of the decision in person by the presiding judge, who ordered the court interpreter to record the delivery—even though Badelles refused to sign a receipt.
The judge also telegraphed the Africa Law Office on December 28, 1959, confirming that a copy had been sent via registered mail on December 24, 1959 and that Badelles had also personally received a copy.

Upon receipt of the decision on January 4, 1960, the Africa Law Office sent a notice of appeal by registered mail on the same day.
Subsequently, on January 5, 1960, Badelles personally filed a notice of appeal accompanied by a cash appeal bond of sixty pesos.
Counsel for Cabili objected to the appeal, contending that the appeal was filed outside the five-day period provided by Section 178 of the Revised Election Code.
On February 15 and 19, 1960, respectively, the court dismissed both appeals on the grounds that they were not filed within the prescribed five-day period and that the appeal bond was insufficient.

Following the dismissal, Badelles filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. No. 27428-R) seeking to annul and set aside the dismissal orders and to give due course to his appeal.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition on September 30, 1960.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that:

The personal receipt of the decision by Badelles, who was merely inquiring out of curiosity, did not constitute proper service under the rules.
The telegram sent to Badelles’ counsel, which did not contain the contents of the decision, could not be regarded as a substitute for proper service.
The five-day appeal period should commence on January 4, 1960—the date the counsel received the decision—rather than December 28, 1959, when Badelles personally obtained a copy.

A motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the case to be elevated to the Supreme Court for final review.

Whether the personal receipt of the decision by the aggrieved party (Badelles) constitutes valid service for the purposes of computing the appeal period under Section 178 of the Revised Election Code.
Whether the telegram received by Badelles’ counsel, which did not include the contents of the decision, satisfies the service requirement under the relevant rules.
Whether the five-day statutory period for filing an appeal should be computed from the date the counsel received the decision (January 4, 1960) rather than from the date Badelles personally received a copy (December 28, 1959).
Whether the filing of the appeal and the corresponding appeal bond (amounting to sixty pesos) comply with the statutory requirements for a valid appeal.