Title
Supreme Court
Cabang vs. Basay
Case
G.R. No. 180587
Decision Date
Mar 20, 2009
Petitioners occupied Lot 7777 since 1956, believing it was Lot 7778. Respondents, rightful owners, sought recovery; SC ruled in their favor, denying family home claim and ordering eviction.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 180587)
Expanded Legal Reasoning Model

Facts:

  • Background and Ownership of the Property
    • The property in dispute is Lot No. 7777, Ts-222 in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur.
    • Originally, the lot was owned by the late Felix Odong, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2,768 issued on March 9, 1966, pursuant to Decree No. N-64.
    • Neither Felix Odong nor his heirs ever occupied or took possession of the lot.
  • Transaction and Transfer of Title
    • On June 16, 1987, petitioners Simeon Cabang, Virginia Cabang, and Venancio Cabang (alias “Dondon”) acquired the property from the heirs of Felix Odong for P8,000.00.
    • Following the purchase, the original Certificate of Title was cancelled and replaced with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22,048 issued on August 6, 1987 in the name of the petitioners.
    • Despite securing the title, the petitioners did not occupy the property.
  • Possession by Respondents
    • Respondents Mr. and Mrs. Guillermo Basay had been in continuous, open, peaceful, and adverse possession of the disputed lot since 1956.
    • Originally, in cadastral proceedings for Lot No. 7778 of the Molave Townsite, respondents claimed that lot based on their actual occupation.
    • Later, due to a relocation of townsite lots in 1992 and discovered discrepancies in actual occupied areas, it was determined that the respondents were occupying Lot No. 7777.
  • Litigation and Procedural History
    • On June 23, 1992, petitioners filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property (Civil Case No. 92-20-127) against respondents, seeking possession of Lot No. 7777.
    • The trial court rendered a decision on July 19, 1996, dismissing the case on the ground that petitioners’ rights had been barred by laches, and thereby denied the execution of the judgment.
    • Petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision. On December 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court by declaring petitioners entitled to the possession of Lot No. 7777, subject to respondents’ rights under Articles 448, 546, 547, and 548 of the New Civil Code.
    • A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was subsequently filed by respondents (G.R. No. 139601), but earlier, a Resolution on October 18, 1999, denied the petition for review on grounds of late filing and improper service.
    • After the judgment became final and executory, the case was remanded to the regional trial court where further proceedings were undertaken, including the commissioning of a survey by the official surveyor designated by the DENR, and subsequent determination of the value and assignment of improvements on the property.
    • On June 18, 2002, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion for Execution asserting that the improvements on the property were family homes, thus seeking relief from execution.
    • On September 6, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion for execution on the ground that the houses were not deemed family homes.
    • The CA later reversed the trial court’s Order, and petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated September 21, 2007.
  • The Controversial Family Home Issue
    • Petitioners later argued that the property on which the improvements were built was a duly constituted family home and, as such, was exempt from execution.
    • The sole factual contention involved whether the improvements (residential houses not explicitly established as family homes) qualified for exemption from execution under the Family Code, given that the title of the property belonged to respondents.
    • The petitioners’ argument was raised at a late stage, effectively amounting to an attempt to vary the final and executory judgment.

Issues:

  • Whether the family home defense is valid to exempt the improved structures from execution despite the title and ownership being in the hands of respondents.
    • Does the designation of the improvements as family homes render them exempt from the enforcement of an executory judgment?
    • Is there a legal basis, under the Family Code and relevant jurisprudence, for considering the improvements as constituting a family home?
  • Whether a final and executory judgment can be modified by raising issues related to the nature of the improvements after the judgment has become final.
    • Can fresh arguments regarding the family home status be entertained after the period for appeal has lapsed?
    • Does the invocation of the family home doctrine constitute an impermissible afterthought capable of altering the terms of a final judgment?
  • Whether the execution order must strictly conform to the essential particulars of the final judgment.
    • Is the lower court’s ministerial duty to execute the judgment compromised by attempting to reinterpret the nature of the properties involved?
    • Does the deviation from the terms of the appellate judgment render the order of execution a nullity?

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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