Facts:
Bueno Industrial & Development Corporation (
BIDCOR) and R.C. Aquino Timber and Plywood Co., Inc. (
TIMPLY) were timber licensees in Agusan, with respondent
Montano A. Ortiz as Judge of the Court of First Instance and respondent
Macario C. Conde as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff. BIDCOR held timber license No. 61 and TIMPLY held timber license No. 68, and their concessions adjoined and, according to the
Bureau of Forestry, overlapped in certain portions. On May 29, 1963,
Rafael C. Aquino, for TIMPLY, was granted Ordinary Right-of-Way Permit No. 237 to construct a logging road for seventeen (17) kilometers and thirty (30) meters in width through BIDCOR’s license area, with express conditions that no trees would be cut outside the right-of-way; that merchangable trees cut inside would belong to BIDCOR and could be cut only by the permittee under
express authority from the licensee; that the Director of Forestry’s decision on the exact location and boundaries of the right-of-way would be final; and that violations of forest laws, regulations, or permit terms would cause cancellation and forfeiture of the permittee’s bond. A further condition required that the road would be available for BIDCOR’s use as long as BIDCOR shared proportionately in maintenance expenses. Trouble arose between the concessionaires when TIMPLY allegedly used the road and cut logs along the right-of-way in a manner disputed as to whether it lay within TIMPLY’s permitted area or within BIDCOR’s license area. On January 11, 1964, TIMPLY and Rafael C. Aquino filed Sp. Civil Case No. 168 in the Court of First Instance of Agusan against BIDCOR, Valeriano C. Bueno, and certain BIDCOR security guards, alleging that on January 3 and 4, 1964 the latter stopped TIMPLY logging trucks with violence and intimidation, and praying for a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain further acts and, after trial, a permanent injunction. BIDCOR answered with counterclaims and counter-petition for prohibition, injunction, and mandamus, and alleged that the logs TIMPLY hauled were taken from BIDCOR’s concession under license No. 61, and that any violence and intimidation were committed by men of TIMPLY and not by BIDCOR. After hearing, on February 10, 1964, respondent Judge issued a preliminary injunction ordering that respondents be restrained from disturbing or stopping TIMPLY’s logging operations in any portion of the area covered by TIMPLY’s license agreement No. 68 and where they had been cutting and hauling logs on or before January 3 and 4, 1964, or from stopping the hauling of logs cut by TIMPLY. BIDCOR sought relief in the Court of Appeals by certiorari, but the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because TIMPLY had amended its main petition to include a damages claim of P320,000.00. On July 15, 1964, BIDCOR filed in the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, which was initially dismissed but later given due course upon reconsideration; on September 1, 1964 the Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunctive writ restraining respondents from enforcing the February 10, 1964 injunction insofar as it related to TIMPLY’s logging operations along and in the vicinity of its right-of-way under Road Right-of-Way Permit No. 237 inside BIDCOR’s timber license area, and further restraining respondents from conducting logging operations in and hauling logs from BIDCOR’s timber license area and from interfering with BIDCOR’s use of the road right-of-way, subject to BIDCOR’s proportional contribution to maintenance under the permit. On December 7, 1964, the Supreme Court issued an alias writ due to alleged violation of its injunction, directing the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan and the Philippine Constabulary to maintain enforcement, and on March 23, 1965 denied respondents’ motion to clarify the injunction, holding that its terms were sufficiently clear because they specifically referred to the right-of-way permit and the timber license and that any location and boundary extent had to be determined on the ground with aid of Bureau of Forestry personnel. The Supreme Court later found that TIMPLY continued logging within the area covered by BIDCOR’s license, resisted entry by foresters, and persisted even after successive writs and enforcement measures, prompting BIDCOR’s request for the challenged trial court injunction to be set aside and for enforcement of the Supreme Court’s own injunction as permanent. The Supreme Court also noted that, notwithstanding its existing injunction, TIMPLY filed a new complaint in the Court of First Instance on May 21, 1965 to restrain enforcement of a letter dated April 30, 1965 by forestry officials, and that trial court issued an injunction notwithstanding BIDCOR’s intervention and objection, a development that became the subject of another petition (G.R. No. L-24822). In the instant case, the principal question presented was whether respondent Court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the February 10, 1964 preliminary injunction.
Issues:
Did respondent Judge commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction on February 10, 1964 that allowed TIMPLY to continue logging and hauling within the disputed areas despite forestry findings on boundary and permit compliance?
Ruling:
Ratio:
Doctrine: