G.R. No. L-60151 - Budlong vs. Apalisok

The case involves Criminal Case No. 1838 with petitioner Salvador L. Budlong acting as the Third Assistant City Fiscal of Tagbilaran City and respondent Judge Aquiles T. Apalisok, in his capacity as Acting City Judge of Tagbilaran City.
The private respondent in the case is Camilo Puyo y Galagar, who was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence committed against a victim.

The petitioner filed an information before the respondent court charging Camilo Puyo y Galagar for the crime.
During the scheduled arraignment on February 4, 1982, the accused pleaded guilty to the charged offense.
Immediately after the plea, the respondent judge rendered judgment in open court by convicting the accused, sentencing him to thirty (30) days of imprisonment, and ordering him to pay the costs, without imposing any civil liability.

At the time of the sentencing hearing, the accused manifested his intention to avail of the provisions under Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
Acting on his application for probation, the court gave the counsel of the accused five (5) days to file the petition for probation.
On February 5, 1982, the petitioner filed an ex-parte motion to set the case for hearing to determine the civil liability of the accused.
On February 11, 1982, the respondent court issued an order denying the ex-parte motion on the ground that it was filed out of time because the accused had already filed an application for probation, and it declared the case “closed and terminated.”

The petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on February 18, 1982, challenging the February 11, 1982 order.
On February 19, 1982, the respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration. The denial was based on the contention that under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1257 (amending Section 4 of PD No. 968), the court must suspend execution of the sentence upon the defendant’s probation application, and that a separate hearing to prove civil liability would, by its timing, effectively nullify the suspension of the sentence.

The petitioner, in his capacity as Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal, then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the respondent court’s orders of February 11, 1982, and February 19, 1982.
The Supreme Court's resolution provided for the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as impleaded, and proceeded after receiving comments from the Solicitor General while the private respondent opted not to comment.

The petitioner argued that the respondent judge erroneously held that the ex-parte motion was filed out of time due to the accused’s probation application.
He also contended that the denial of the motion for reconsideration was erroneous on two counts:

The judge improperly applied the rule by articulating that an application for probation should suspend the proof of civil liability after conviction and sentencing.
The judge erroneously concluded that setting the case for a hearing on civil liability would nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and defeat the very purpose of the Probation Law.

Whether the respondent judge erred in holding that the ex-parte motion to set the case for hearing on civil liability was filed out of time solely because the accused had already applied for probation.
Whether the judge’s denial of the motion for reconsideration was proper in reasoning that proving civil liability after the plea and conviction undercuts the probation process, thus asserting that determination of civil liability should have been made before the rendering of judgment.
Whether the separation between the criminal penalty (and its suspension through probation) and the civil liability, which the victim is entitled to recover, was adequately recognized by the lower court.
Whether the respondent judge’s actions in closing and terminating the case by denying further proceedings on civil liability violated the due process rights of the victim.