A.M. No. P-01-1464 - Booc vs. Bantuas

On August 22, 1994, respondent, acting in his capacity as sheriff and pursuant to a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1718 (“Felipe G. Javier, Jr. vs. Rufino Booc”), filed a Notice of Levy with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City.
The property subject to the levy was a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-19209, which was owned by Five Star Marketing Corporation, not by an individual.

Salvador Booc charged that respondent executed the levy on the property, despite knowing that the property was corporate-owned and that Rufino Booc had no direct ownership of the corporation’s land.
On July 31, 1995, the corporation expressly informed respondent sheriff of its ownership and demanded cancellation of the levy to protect its title.
The demand was disregarded, and on August 20, 1999, the corporation received a “Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property” followed by a public auction scheduled for August 31, 1999.
To safeguard its interests, the corporation proceeded to file an action for Quieting of Title.

In his answer to the complaint, the respondent asserted that the levy was filed on the basis of Rufino Booc’s alleged share, rights, interest, and participation in the property, as he was said to hold approximately 200 shares in the corporation.
He based his actions on Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the enforcement of judgment via levy on all types of property.
The respondent further contended that the corporation had not objected to the sale, and even alleged that the corporation functioned merely as an alter ego or “dummy” for Rufino Booc and his brother, Sheikding Booc.
A supporting document was submitted in the form of an affidavit by Sheikding Booc, admitting that a simulated transfer of shares had taken place to avert the levy on the property.

While the respondent maintained that he was simply executing his official duty, the complainant rebutted the allegation by highlighting that the trial court had issued a restraining order specifically addressing the scope of the levy sale.
The instruction was that the sale should pertain solely to Rufino Booc’s shares of stock in the corporation, not the property itself.

Whether the respondent sheriff acted beyond his authority by levying and auctioning a property owned by a corporation based solely on conjectural interests of an individual stockholder.

Whether the respondent’s reliance on the alleged shareholding of Rufino Booc justified levying on corporate property, given the separate legal personality of the corporation.

Whether the respondent’s disregard of the trial court’s restraining order, which limited the sale to shares of stock and not the real property, amounted to grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.