Title
Blanco vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 180164
Decision Date
Jun 17, 2008
Mayor Blanco disqualified in 1995 for vote-buying; subsequent disqualifications overturned as SC ruled 1995 penalty limited to that election, no removal from office occurred.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 207429)

Facts:

  • Background of the Petitioner
    • Florentino P. Blanco served as Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan from 1987 to 1992.
    • His prior public office experience and political standing became the basis for subsequent electoral contests.
  • The 1995 Elections and Disqualification
    • Blanco ran for mayor in the May 8, 1995 elections and won by a margin exceeding 6,000 votes against Eduardo A. Alarilla.
    • A petition for disqualification was filed against him on the ground of vote-buying.
    • On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying Blanco under Sec. 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code for vote-buying.
    • The Supreme Court, in Blanco v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 122258, July 21, 1997), affirmed his disqualification based on Sec. 68, thereby cementing the electoral penalty for the 1995 elections.
  • Subsequent Electoral Contests and Related Proceedings
    • In the 1998 elections, Blanco again ran for mayor.
      • A petition was filed by Domiciano G. Ruiz, a local voter, invoking the Court’s prior disqualification ruling.
      • The COMELEC, Second Division, in SPA No. 98-043, dismissed the petition citing that the disqualification attached only to the 1995 election and that no criminal action or conviction under Sec. 261(a) had been rendered to trigger the accessory penalty under Sec. 264.
    • In the 2001 elections, Blanco’s candidacy was again challenged.
      • Private respondent sought to disqualify him on the basis of the prior Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 122258.
      • The COMELEC, Second Division, issued SPA No. 01-050 on May 11, 2001, disqualifying him under Sec. 40(b) of the Local Government Code for allegedly having been removed from office through an administrative case.
      • Blanco’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied for being filed beyond the prescribed five-day reglementary period.
    • In the 2004 elections, Blanco again sought the mayoralty, but:
      • A petition for disqualification was filed based on the earlier ruling.
      • Blanco eventually withdrew his certificate of candidacy, leading to the dismissal of the disqualification petition as moot.
  • Filing for Declaratory Relief and the 2007 Elections
    • Concerned about recurring disqualification challenges in future elections, Blanco filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.
      • On November 6, 2005, the RTC declared him eligible to run for public office, particularly in view of the provisions of Sec. 40(b) of the Local Government Code and applicable sections of the Omnibus Election Code.
    • Blanco ran once again in the May 14, 2007 elections.
      • A fresh petition for disqualification was filed by private respondent, relying on both the precedent set in Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 122258, and the COMELEC Resolution in SPA No. 01-050.
      • On August 28, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, issued a resolution in SPA Case No. 07-410 disqualifying him from the upcoming elections on the ground that he had not been the recipient of any presidential pardon, amnesty, or clemency to mitigate the effects of previous disqualifications.
  • Procedural and Jurisdictional Considerations
    • Blanco raised the issue that he failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution before the COMELEC en banc and went directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
    • The petition invoked Sec. 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution regarding the submission and review of decisions by the COMELEC.
    • The argument was bolstered by precedents including Soriano v. COMELEC and Repol v. COMELEC which interpret the finality and appealability of COMELEC decisions.
  • Allegations of Grave Abuse of Discretion
    • Blanco contended that the COMELEC, Second Division, committed grave abuse of discretion by:
      • Relying on the previous disqualification ruling in Blanco v. COMELEC, which applied solely to the 1995 elections.
      • Failing to consider that his disqualification from the 1995 contest was solely an electoral sanction and did not result from a criminal conviction.
      • Wrongfully applying Sec. 40(b) of the Local Government Code in disqualifying him for removal from office—a removal that was rendered in a context where he had not effectively held office post-disqualification.
    • Blanco argued that the issuance of the resolution was a nullity, as it improperly extended the scope of COMELEC’s jurisdiction given the absence of criminal proceedings and conviction.

Issues:

  • Jurisdictional and Procedural Adequacy
    • Whether the failure of the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc invalidates his direct appeal to the Supreme Court via certiorari.
    • Whether the procedural rule requiring motion for reconsideration can be relaxed when the resolution sought to be set aside is essentially a nullity.
  • Substance of the Disqualification
    • Whether the COMELEC, Second Division, gravely abused its discretion in disqualifying Blanco based on the precedent set in Blanco v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 122258) and its subsequent resolutions, given that:
      • The disqualification in the 1995 elections was limited to that particular electoral contest under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
      • There was no criminal conviction that would invoke the accessory penalty under Sec. 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.
    • Whether Blanco’s failure to secure a presidential pardon, amnesty, or any form of executive clemency should preclude him from running for office, given the absence of a criminal proceeding confirming his vote-buying offense.
  • Application of Sec. 40(b) of the Local Government Code
    • Whether it is proper to disqualify Blanco under Sec. 40(b) for having allegedly been removed from office through an administrative case, especially in light of the facts that:
      • There is a contention that he never truly held office following his disqualification in 1995.
      • The administrative removal was not the result of a full-blown criminal conviction.

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)
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