Facts:

In the case of Ramon L. Blanco vs. Jose Bernabe, Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila, and The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., the petitioner, Ramon L. Blanco, was involved in a civil case (No. 105831) filed by The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. in the Municipal Court of Manila. The judgment against Blanco was rendered on September 12, 1935, and he was notified of this judgment on September 25, 1935. Subsequently, on October 7, 1935, Blanco submitted a notice of appeal to the clerk's office of the municipal court, along with a money order for P16 and a communication from his attorney, Vicente Pelaez, addressed to the Collector of Internal Revenue. This communication indicated that the enclosed money order was intended as a bond to cover any potential judgment for costs that might be awarded against Blanco by the appellate court. However, the Collector of Internal Revenue returned the money order, stating that he lacked the authority to act as its depos...

Facts:

Parties Involved:

• Petitioner: Ramon L. Blanco
• Respondents: Jose Bernabe (Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila) and The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co.

Case Background:

• In Civil Case No. 105831 of the Municipal Court of Manila, The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. (plaintiff) sued Ramon L. Blanco (defendant).
• On September 12, 1935, judgment was entered against Blanco, and he was notified of the judgment on September 25, 1935.

Appeal Process:

• On October 7, 1935, Blanco filed a notice of appeal and submitted a money order for P16 to the clerk's office of the Municipal Court.
• Blanco's attorney also sent a communication to the Collector of Internal Revenue, enclosing a money order for P25 as a bond to cover potential costs in the appellate court.
• The Collector of Internal Revenue returned the money order, stating he had no authority to accept it. Blanco then attached the money order to the case record.

Legal Requirements for Appeal:

• Section 76 of Act No. 190 (as amended by Act No. 3615) outlines the procedure for perfecting an appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace or municipal court.
• The requirements include:
  • Filing a notice of appeal within 15 days of judgment notification.
  • Depositing P16 as an appellate court docket fee (or delivering it to the clerk in Manila).
  • Providing a bond of P50 or a certificate of deposit of P25 with the municipal treasurer (or Collector of Internal Revenue in Manila).

Respondents' Argument:

• The respondents conceded that Blanco complied with all requirements except for presenting the deposit certificate to the court.
• The failure to present the certificate was due to the Collector of Internal Revenue's refusal to accept the deposit, not Blanco's omission.

Issue:

1. Whether the appeal was properly perfected despite the absence of a deposit certificate.
2. Whether mandamus is the appropriate remedy in this case.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Ramon L. Blanco, and granted the remedy of mandamus. The Court held that the appeal was duly taken, and the respondent judge was obligated to certify the appeal to the corresponding Court of First Instance.

Ratio:

1. Purpose of the Deposit Certificate:

   • The deposit certificate is merely evidence that the required deposit has been made. The failure to present it should not invalidate the appeal if the deposit was actually made in the prescribed form and time.
   • The law should not be interpreted to sacrifice justice for technicalities.

2. Liberal Construction of Procedural Laws:

   • Procedural laws are means to achieve justice, not ends in themselves. Courts should liberally construe procedural rules to assist parties in obtaining speedy justice.
   • Technicalities that do not aid justice deserve scant consideration.

3. Appropriateness of Mandamus:

   • Mandamus is the proper remedy when a judge refuses to perform a duty clearly required by law, such as certifying an appeal that has been duly taken.
   • Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a speedy remedy, does not apply here because the appeal was already taken, and the judge refused to certify it without reason.

4. Duty of the Judge:

   • The respondent judge was under a duty, pursuant to Section 77 of the Procedural Law, to certify the appeal to the Court of First Instance.

Concurring Justices:

• Avancena, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concurred with the decision.