G.R. No. 218232 - Revilla, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 1st Division

The present case arises from a civil suit in the Municipal Court of Manila, where “The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co.” filed a case against Ramon L. Blanco.
A judgment was rendered against Blanco on September 12, 1935, and he was notified of such judgment on September 25, 1935.

On October 7, 1935, Ramon L. Blanco, by his attorney, executed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
Concurrently, a money order in the amount of P16 was submitted at the clerk’s office, satisfying one of the prescribed requirements for perfecting the appeal.
The petitioner’s attorney sent a communication to the Collector of Internal Revenue, along with a money order of P25, by way of bond in lieu of an appeal bond as required under Section 76 of Act No. 190 (as amended by Act No. 3615).

Filing with the justice of the peace a notice of intent to appeal;
Delivering a deposit (or corresponding certificate as evidence that the deposit has been made) with the municipal treasurer or, in Manila, with the Collector of Internal Revenue; and
Giving the requisite bond or, alternatively, depositing an amount (P25 in this case) as security for cost judgments.

The law mandates that the deposit certificate, normally issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue or the appropriate official, serves as evidence that the mandated sum has indeed been deposited.

Although all procedural requisites were complied with, the petitioner was unable to present the deposit certificate to the court.
The non-presentation was attributable not to any fault on the part of the petitioner, but to the Collector of Internal Revenue's refusal to receive the deposit.
Consequently, the money order was returned, and the petitioner affixed it to the case record as evidence that the deposit had been attempted in compliance with the law.

The respondents conceded that all other requisites for a proper appeal were observed except for the presentation of the deposit certificate.
They argued that the absence of this certificate rendered the appeal defective and that a special mandate (mandamus) was not available since an alternative speedy remedy existed under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Whether the non-presentation of the deposit certificate—due solely to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue—is sufficient grounds to invalidate the perfecting of the appeal.
Whether the court may exercise its discretion to grant mandamus relief directing the respondent judge to certify the appeal to the Court of First Instance, despite the absence of the deposit certificate.
Whether the strict application of procedural technicalities should prevail over the substantive purpose of ensuring speedy justice, particularly when the deposit had in fact been made.