Title
Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice
Case
G.R. No. 42821
Decision Date
Jan 18, 1936
Juan Bengzon sought retirement gratuity under Act No. 4051 after mandatory retirement. Governor-General vetoed Section 7, excluding justices of the peace. Court upheld veto, denying Bengzon’s claim.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 42821)

Facts:

Juan Bengzon v. The Secretary of Justice and the Insular Auditor, G.R. No. 42821, January 18, 1936, the Supreme Court En Banc, Malcolm, J., writing for the Court.

The petitioner, Juan Bengzon, was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan, on March 7, 1912. Having reached the age of sixty‑five, he ceased to hold office on January 14, 1933, under the mandatory retirement provision of Act No. 3899, and surrendered his office to the auxiliary justice of the peace pursuant to instructions from the Judge of First Instance.

Bengzon applied for a retirement gratuity under Act No. 4051 by communications to the Secretary of Justice, the Governor‑General, and the Insular Auditor, but was informed he was not entitled to benefits. On March 7, 1934 he filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of Justice and the Insular Auditor to pay the gratuity. The trial court dismissed the petition; the petitioner appealed to this Court.

Act No. 4051 created retirement gratuities and fixed rates and procedures; among its provisions were §7 (extending gratuities to justices of the peace who relinquished office in 1933), §10 (an appropriation: “The necessary sum to carry out the purposes of this Act is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated”), and §12 (a severability clause preserving the remainder of the Act if any section were disapproved). The Governor‑General “approved” the Act on February 21, 1933, expressly excepting §7; the Philippine Legislature accepted the veto. The parties stipulated the foregoing basic facts.

At trial the judge dismissed the mandamus petition, relying on a technicality that the duty sought would require the Governor‑General’s intervention and thus respondents could not be compelled. The trial court’s dismissal was appealed; the Supreme Court addressed squarely whether the Governor‑General validl...(Pro-only)

Issues:

  • Procedural: Does the petitioner state a proper cause of action for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice and the Insular Auditor to compel payment under Act No. 4051?
  • Substantive: Was the Governor‑General’s veto of section 7 of Act No. 4051 a valid exercise of the power to veto particular items of an appropriation bill under section 19 of the Organic Act (and the ana...(Pro-only)

Ruling:

  • (Pro-only)

Ratio:

  • (Pro-only)

Doctrine:

  • (Pro-only)

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