G.R. No. 95136 - Baylosis vs. Chavez, Jr.

The case involves the constitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, which penalizes any person who unlawfully manufactures, deals in, acquires, disposes of, or possesses any firearm (or its parts, ammunition, or related instruments) when used in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, or subversion.
This issue was raised through a special action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus challenging the validity of the provision on constitutional grounds.
The challenged provision had been attacked previously in the case of Misolas v. Panga (181 SCRA 648, 1990), where the Court had repelled the arguments against it.

The case originated from a criminal information filed in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig charging petitioners Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, along with Marco Palo, with violation of PD 1866.

The information alleged that on or about March 29, 1988, in San Juan, Metro Manila, the accused – along with known high-ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army – possessed firearms and explosives, including one AK-47 rifle with a magazine and grenades, without the required licenses.

That the facts charged did not constitute an offense because they were based on an unconstitutional or repealed statute.
That the trial court was devoid of jurisdiction for the same reasons.

Both the initial motion to quash (dated April 24, 1990) and a subsequent motion for reconsideration (dated July 12, 1990) were denied, leading the petitioners to file the present action before the Supreme Court.

The petitioners contended that the doctrine established in previous cases (e.g., People v. Amado Hernandez, Enrile v. Salazar, Enrile v. Amin) – which held that the felony of rebellion in the Revised Penal Code cannot be complexed with other crimes such as murder—rendered the PD 1866 provision unconstitutional.
They argued that the provision violated several constitutional guarantees:

The petitioners also asserted that the provision allows a prosecutorial option that encourages the imposition of a heavier penalty (reclusion perpetua) by charging illegal possession connected with rebellion, instead of charging rebels under the more lenient provision for rebellion (prision mayor).

PD 1866 was enacted on June 29, 1983, through the exercise of the President’s legislative powers under the 1973 Constitution.
The decree was designed to codify laws on the illegal manufacture, possession, and dealing in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and related instruments, and to impose stiffer penalties in cases where these acts were committed in furtherance of rebellion, insurrection, or subversion.
The provision in controversy specified that if a firearm or explosive is possessed or used under the circumstances mentioned, the penalty would range from reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua—or even the death penalty (reduced to reclusion perpetua following the 1987 Constitution).

The petitioners sought to elevate a jurisprudential doctrine over subsequent legislative enactments, arguing that established case law should render the PD 1866 provision unconstitutional.
They argued that the application of a harsher penalty for what might be merely an ingredient of a political crime (illegal possession of firearms) is unsound and undermines the principles of fairness and proportionality embedded in due process.

Is the third paragraph of Section 1 of PD 1866 constitutional, particularly in light of its imposition of harsher penalties (reclusion perpetua) for illegal possession of firearms when linked to rebellion, insurrection, or subversion, as compared to the lesser penalty for rebellion under the Revised Penal Code?
Does the provision violate the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process by creating an arbitrary or oppressive law?

Does the challenged provision constitute an impermissible usurpation of the judicial function by essentially determining guilt or enforcing punishment absent a judicial trial?
Is it within the legislature’s authority to enact a statute that prescribes a heavier penalty for an offense when committed in connection with political crimes, thus “complexing” the offense?

Does the possibility that an accused person might later face additional prosecution for the underlying political crime (rebellion, insurrection, or subversion) along with the charge under PD 1866 amount to double jeopardy?
Does the discretion given to government prosecutors to choose among charges based on the same evidence violate the equal protection clause?

Is the penalty imposed under PD 1866 (reclusion perpetua, even when reduced from death) considered “cruel, degrading, or inhuman” punishment in light of its disproportion to the offense, particularly when compared with the lower penalty for rebellion?