G.R. No. 7487 - Barnuevo vs. Fuster

Constanza Yaflez de Barnuevo (plaintiff) and Gabriel Fuster (defendant) were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in Malaga, Spain, on February 7, 1875.
In February 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled there, and acquired both real and personal property.
Around the middle of 1896, Constanza Yaflez came to Manila, where her husband was residing, and lived in conjugal relations with him.

On April 4, 1899, the spouses executed a public document in Manila in which they mutually resolved to separate and live apart.

The document authorized Constanza Yaflez to move to Spain and reside at her convenience.
Gabriel Fuster undertook to send her a monthly support allowance of 300 pesetas, payable in Madrid, starting from June 1899.

The defendant complied with the allowance until August 1899 and then ceased further payments.

In early March 1909, the plaintiff returned to the Philippines, while the defendant had left in early February 1909.
On March 11, 1909, Constanza Yaflez commenced divorce proceedings against Gabriel Fuster.

She alleged that her husband had committed adultery around 1899, cohabiting with another woman with whom he also had two children.
Her prayer included a decree of divorce, separation and liquidation of conjugal properties (with an equal partition), and ordered payment of arrears in alimony amounting to 36,000 Spanish pesetas (equivalent to 7,220 Spanish dollars or P12,959.90 after conversion).

Gabriel Fuster denied the plaintiff’s allegations related to adultery and the characterization of conjugal properties.
He claimed that both parties were Spanish subjects domiciled in Barcelona, asserting that the agreement regarding alimony was governed by Spanish law, not Philippine law.
He alleged that a letter sent in May 1900 showed his desire for the plaintiff to return to Manila and that her continued separate residence breached this instruction.
The defendant further argued that the action for divorce should be within the exclusive jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts under Spanish law and that the case had prescribed in time.

The Court of First Instance of Manila held that it had jurisdiction over the case based on the substantial residency and domicile of both parties in Manila over many years.
The trial court:

Decreed the suspension of the married life.
Ordered the defendant to pay the support arrears (initially P5,010.17).
Directed the partition of the conjugal property, to be effected by commissioners if the parties could not agree.

Both parties appealed the decision, engaging issues of jurisdiction, the proper interpretation of the support agreement, and the classification and division of property.

Whether the Philippine courts had jurisdiction over the case even though both spouses were Spanish subjects supposedly domiciled in Barcelona.
Whether the long period of residency and established domicile in Manila for both parties over the previous seventeen years was sufficient to confer local jurisdiction.

Whether the evidence supported the finding that the defendant committed adultery between 1899 and 1909.
Whether such adultery, regardless of the absence of alleged public scandal or contempt, was a valid ground for divorce under Philippine law.

Whether the property in question should be deemed conjugal property liable to the rules of division under Philippine law, notwithstanding the defendant’s reliance on Foral Law principles from the Balearic Islands.
The proper treatment of property brought into the marriage by the wife (dowry or paraphernal property) and its exclusion from the marital estate.

Whether the court correctly interpreted the contract referring to the monthly allowance of 300 pesetas and its conversion to Philippine currency.
Whether the defendant’s defense regarding the type of pesetas (Spanish versus Mexican) and the timing of the claim affected the award of arrears.

Whether the trial court erred in inviting special defenses that contested jurisdiction, personal status, and the applicable law over marital affairs.
Whether the actions taken by the lower court in appointing commissioners to partition property and in addressing missing evidence on issues such as the alleged dowry were proper.