G.R. No. 165287 - Barcellano vs. Banas

The respondent, Dolores BaAas, is an heir of Bartolome BaAas, owner of Lot 4485, PLS-722-D in Hindi, Bacacay, Albay.
Adjacent to the BaAas property is the lot owned by Vicente Medina, identified by Original Certificate of Title No. VH-9094 and covering 1,877 square meters.

On March 17, 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the adjoining owners—the heirs of Bartolome BaAas—which included Dolores BaAas and her siblings/relations (namely, Crispino Bermillo and Isabela Bermillo-Beruela).
Crispino Bermillo, acting as the family representative, agreed to the offer with the understanding that the sale would occur after the harvest season.
On April 3, 1997, Medina proceeded to sell the property to petitioner Armando Barcellano for Php60,000.00.

The very next day, the BaAas heirs, upon learning of the sale from Medina himself, sought to exercise their right of redemption by inquiring directly about the transaction.
Medina confirmed that the sale to Barcellano had been executed, and the heirs, intending to redeem the property, expressed the need to tender the required amount.
However, due to a lack of immediate tender of the Php60,000.00 redemption amount, the heirs were informed that the deed of sale had already been executed, thereby complicating their position.

On April 5, 1997, aggrieved by the outcome, the heirs sought intervention by approaching the Office of the Barangay Council.
On April 9, 1997, a meeting was held at the Barangay Council involving the heirs and Barcellano.

Medina (or his tenant acting on his behalf) was notably absent.
During the meeting, Barcellano purportedly offered to sell the property back but at an increased price of Php90,000.00.

The failure of the parties to reconcile their differences led the Lupon to issue a Certification to File Action.

On October 24, 1997, Dolores BaAas initially filed an action for Legal Redemption before the Regional Trial Court.
The petition was later withdrawn on February 5, 1998, with the rationale that, given the prevailing economic conditions, the redemption funds were required for immediate and emergency needs.
Subsequently, on March 11, 1998, Dolores BaAas (represented by Bermillo) filed a renewed action for Legal Redemption.

Barcellano opposed this action, arguing that he had complied with Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code, while alleging that the respondents had not exercised their redemption rights within the statutory period.

On March 15, 2000, the trial court dismissed the BaAas heirs’ complaint for failure to meet the condition precedent: they did not make a formal offer to redeem nor tender the redemption price (or consign it) within the mandated 30-day period.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision.

The appellate court held that the filing of the complaint before the Katarungang Pambarangay constituted a notice to Barcellano and effectively set the judicial process of legal redemption in motion.
It was determined that a formal offer, tender of the redemption price, and consignation were procedures intended for potential future redemption, but became nonessential once a legal redemption suit had been initiated.

He asserted that the absence of the mandatory written notice under Art. 1623 should preclude the running of the redemption period.
Barcellano further contended that actual notice (e.g., through the Barangay proceedings) sufficed to inform the heirs, thereby negating the necessity for written notification.
The petitioner also disputed the application of Presidential Decree No. 1508, arguing that the filing of the complaint by the heirs did not amount to a valid exercise of the right of redemption.

The core legal debate centered on the interpretation and mandatory nature of a written notice under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
Prior Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Conejero v. Court of Appeals, Verdad v. Court of Appeals, Gosiengfiao Guillen v. Court of Appeals) were cited to stress the indispensability of written notice in legal redemption cases.
The discussion elaborated that without a written notice, the statutory period for redemption does not commence, irrespective of any actual or oral knowledge.

Whether the absence of a written notice, as required by Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code, prevents the commencement of the 30-day period for the exercise of the right of legal redemption.

Whether actual notice received by the heirs, even though not in writing, may suffice to trigger the redemption period and validate their right of redemption.

Whether the filing of a complaint before the Barangay Council can be deemed a valid exercise of the right of redemption in lieu of the formal requirements such as tender of payment or consignation.

Whether the appellate court’s interpretation, which effectively relaxed the strict requirements of written notice in the presence of actual notice, can be justified under the circumstances of the case.