G.R. No. 179271 - Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency vs. Commission on Elections

The case consolidates G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295 involving petitions by BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) and others against the Commission on Elections (Comelec), with various intervenors including AANGAT TAYO, ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, and the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to intervene seeking clarification on several issues concerning the allocation of party-list seats and the adjustment of the number of legislative districts.
The intervening issues include whether there are 219 or 220 legislative districts, the appropriate number of available party-list seats (54 instead of 55), and which party-list representatives shall be enrolled in the Roll of Members considering constitutional limitations.

The discrepancy between the previous count (220 districts) and the updated figure (219 districts) due to the annulment of legislative creation (e.g., the Shariff Kabunsuan issue).
Whether all 32 party-list representatives listed in Table 3 should be enrolled, which could potentially cause an excess in the total membership of the House (i.e., rising to 270 members against the constitutional cap).
The exact meaning of “additional seats” and whether the two-percent (2%) threshold applies to both the guaranteed seats and to additional seats.

Armi Jane Roa-Borje, nominee of Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a motion for partial reconsideration in intervention, asserting that the party-list allocation method deprived parties with significant constituencies and violated due process and equal protection by favoring those not meeting the 2% threshold.
The Court received updated figures when the Comelec, via National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001, revised the vote count and number of districts. The updated data reflected adjustments such as the cancellation of FPJPM’s registration and the reduction of legislative districts from 220 to 219 due to the voiding of Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation.

The 1987 Constitution limits the membership of the House of Representatives to a maximum of 250 members unless increased by law.
The Constitution provides that party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total membership, meaning for every four legislative district seats, one party-list seat is automatically created.
Historical data showed that legislative districts, increased piecemeal from the original 200, have raised the total number of House members beyond the cap, with the corresponding seats for party-list representation adjusting accordingly (e.g., from 50 seats in 1992 to 55 in 2010, subject to changes in district counts).

The allocation of party-list seats involves a first round, where parties that secure at least 2% of the total party-list votes are guaranteed one seat, and a second round for additional seats based on proportional vote shares.
The Court clarified that for the computation of additional seats, the proper multiplier is 36 (the difference between 54 available seats and 18 guaranteed seats) rather than 37 used by the Comelec.
A three-seat cap is applied to prevent any single party-list organization from dominating the allocation.
The Court reiterated that filling up all available party-list seats is not mandatory; actual occupancy depends on the number of participating parties and the vote distribution.

Section 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates that legislative districts be apportioned in accordance with a uniform and progressive ratio, while the last clause provides that party-list representatives are elected “as provided by law,” thus granting the Legislature wide discretion in structuring the system.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 (the Party-List Act) embodies the allocation procedures, including the 2% threshold for guaranteed seats and the cap of three seats per party-list group.
A separate opinion by Justice Nachura further criticized the rigid 2% threshold, arguing that it prevents full implementation of the constitutional mandate due to increasing legislative districts and vote disparities.

Whether there are 219 or 220 legislative districts following the annulment of the creation of the province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
How this adjustment impacts the computation of the available party-list seats.

Whether the party-list seats should be reduced from 55 to 54 based on the revised number of legislative districts.
Whether the House should enroll all 32 party-list representatives as indicated by the table, or only those that collectively maintain the 250-member maximum.

Whether the two-percent (2%) threshold should apply to both the guaranteed seats (first round) and additional seats (second round).
If the application of the 2% threshold in the additional seat allocation violates the constitutional directive and results in an incomplete filling of available seats.

Whether the allocation procedure, particularly in the second round, violates due process and the equal protection clause by disadvantaging parties with larger constituencies (e.g., CIBAC, Gabriela, APEC).
Whether the established method creates unintended disparities in proportional representation among party-list organizations.

The extent to which the Court should defer to the legislative scheme and its wide discretion in instituting the party-list system despite the mathematical and physical challenges in filling all available seats.