G.R. No. 42142 - Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Albert

Isabel Ablaza and Pedro Valdez Liongson executed promissory notes and chattel mortgages on autocalesas in favor of Bachrach Motor Company, Inc.
The chattel mortgages were used as security for payment obligations, leading to the filing of an action for foreclosure of these encumbrances.

In conjunction with the foreclosure action, the plaintiff initiated a separate action for the delivery of personal property.
To obtain possession of the autocalesas, the plaintiff presented a bond and secured control of the chattels through the sheriff of Manila.

After the sheriff took control of the chattels, notice was given to the defendants to file a bond for the return of the property within a five-day period, as required by Section 267 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The relevant statutory provision stated: “If a return of the property be not so required within five days after the taking service of notice to the defendant, it must be delivered to the plaintiff, except as provided in section two hundred seventy.”

The defendants failed to file the necessary bond within the prescribed five-day period.
Due to this lapse, the sheriff delivered the chattels to the plaintiff in accordance with the statutory mandate.
Five days after the delivery, the defendants filed an urgent motion seeking the court’s approval for a bond amounting to P6,000 in order to reclaim the replevied chattels.

The trial judge, relying on a theory of general jurisdiction, granted the petition permitting the defendants to file the bond post the statutory period.
The judge assumed that no law explicitly precluded him from taking such action, despite the mandatory language of Section 267.
The petition for a writ of certiorari was consequently raised to question the legal interpretation and application of Section 267.

Whether the trial judge possessed the authority to approve a bond for the redelivery of chattels after the lapse of the five-day statutory period mandated by Section 267 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

How the last sentence of Section 267 should be interpreted with regard to the mandatory requirement for the timely filing of a bond.
Whether the language “must be delivered” imposes an absolute obligation on the sheriff, thus barring any subsequent judicial intervention after the statutory period.

How the provision in the Philippine Code, derived from California and New York practices, influences the interpretation and application of the statutory deadline.
The relevance of earlier decisions from New York, California, and Pennsylvania where the mandatory nature of filing the bond within the prescribed time was emphasized.