G.R. No. 78210 - Arica vs. National Labor Relations Commission

The case is a petition for review on certiorari challenging the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated December 12, 1986, which upheld the decision rendered by Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos on October 9, 1985.
The original complaint, filed on April 9, 1984, charged respondent Stanfilco with non-payment of assembly time, moral damages, and attorney’s fees during a 30‐minute period prior to the scheduled workday.
Following the filing, the parties submitted their respective petition papers, leading to the Arbitration Decision which stated that the 30-minute assembly time, long institutionalized and customary to the workplace, could not be considered as waiting or work time subject to compensation.
On December 12, 1986, the First Division of the NLRC, composed of Acting Presiding Commissioner Franklin Drilon, Commissioner Conrado Maglaya, and Commissioner Rosario D. Encarnacion, issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal by reiterating that the assembly time is non-compensable based on established practice.
The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 15, 1987, which was denied on January 30, 1987, and later, on May 7, 1987, the petition for review on certiorari was filed.

Petitioners contend that the 30-minute period prior to the scheduled work time is compensable as working time, arguing that the preliminary activities performed are primarily for the benefit of their employer.
The activities in question include:

Roll call conducted before the start of duties.
Obtaining individual work assignments from the foreman.
Completion of the Laborer’s Daily Accomplishment Report with explanations regarding the previous day’s work.
Retrieving working materials, tools, and equipment from the stockroom.
Traveling to the field while carrying the necessary materials and equipment.

These activities, although performed before the scheduled start of work, are argued by petitioners to constitute “working time” worthy of compensation.

Respondents argued that the instant complaint is not a new claim but a reiteration of the long-settled issue originally raised in ALU v. Stanfilco (NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76), filed on April 27, 1976.
In the earlier case, petitioners, then represented by the Associated Labor Union (ALU), sought compensation for what was termed “waiting time” and the Minister of Labor subsequently ruled on May 12, 1978 that the 30-minute period was a non-compensable “assembly time.”
The prior decision focused on:

The routine nature and mutual consent inherent in the 30-minute assembly practice.
The absence of a requisite element of employer control during the said period.
The established practice being for the preliminary indication of work availability rather than a time strictly under the employer’s control.

Petitioners claim that there have been “substantial changes in the facts” leading to the argument that the assembly time activities should now be reinterpreted as compensable working time.
Despite such contentions, the records and prior decisions demonstrate that the same claim has been previously adjudicated, and the doctrine of res judicata bars the re-litigation of issues already decided and settled in prior proceedings.

Whether the 30-minute assembly period performed by the petitioners before the scheduled work time is compensable as working time under the Labor Code.
Whether the principle of res judicata should apply when the petitioners argue that there have been significant factual changes in the case at bar compared to the earlier proceedings.
Whether there exists finality in the decision of Secretary Ople, particularly in light of the alleged compromise agreement that purportedly novated his decision and the subsequent withdrawal of the appeal.
Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches are applicable in cases involving the enforcement of labor standards, thereby barring the petitioners from re-litigating the issue.