Facts:

The case, G.R. No. L-40491, involves Segundo Amante as the petitioner against Hon. Delfin Vir. Sunga, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I, and the Vigaaan Agricultural Development Corporation as respondents. The events transpired in a civil case (Civil Case No. 7799) filed by the Vigaaan Agricultural Development Corporation against Amante. On December 2, 1974, Amante filed a motion seeking a 15-day extension to file his answer, with a request directed to the Clerk of Court for submission to the trial court. The motion was granted on December 6, 1974. On December 10, 1974, Amante filed a "Motion for Bill of Particulars." Subsequently, on December 11, 1974, the corporation filed a motion to set aside the order granting Amante’s extension, citing defects in the notification process as per §5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motions were scheduled for hearing on February 7, 1975, when Amante withdrew the "Motion for B

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Facts:

Background of the Case

• Petitioner Segundo Amante filed a written motion on December 2, 1974, requesting an extension of fifteen (15) days from December 9, 1974, within which to file his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 7799 (Vigaaan Agricultural Development Corporation vs. Segundo Amante).
• Although the petitioner's motion was served to the plaintiff’s counsel, it was addressed solely to the Clerk of Court, with an instruction to forward it to the Court immediately upon receipt.

Initial Court Orders and Subsequent Filings

• The trial court, on December 6, 1974, granted the petitioner's motion for extension of time to file his answer.
• On December 10, 1974, petitioner filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars; this motion was properly served to the plaintiff’s counsel and indicated that it would be presented for the Court's consideration at a later set time on December 23, 1974.
• Meanwhile, on December 11, 1974, the respondent (Vigaaan Agricultural Development Corporation), as plaintiff in the complaint, filed a motion to set aside the trial court's Order of December 6, 1974, alleging that the notice of the extension motion was defective for failing to comply with the requirements of Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, and thereby requested that petitioner be declared in default.

Developments during the Hearing

• The motions of petitioner (for a Bill of Particulars) and of the respondent corporation were set for hearing on February 7, 1975.
• During the hearing, after the respondent corporation presented its Articles of Incorporation, petitioner agreed to withdraw his Motion for Bill of Particulars, leaving the respondent's motion for the Court’s resolution pending.
• On the same day, February 7, 1975, petitioner filed his answer with a counterclaim to the complaint.

Issue with the Trial Court Order

• On February 14, 1975, the trial court, based on its opinion that the notice in petitioner’s extension motion (filed on December 2, 1974) was defective for non-compliance with Section 5, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, set aside its previous Order of December 6, 1974.
• The trial court subsequently declared petitioner in default and authorized the Clerk of Court to receive evidence from the plaintiff.

Appeal and Relief Sought

• Petitioner brought the case on certiorari on the ground that his substantial right was violated and that the trial court’s action was merely based on a technical defect.
• The Supreme Court reviewed the case, relying on the pleadings including the respondent corporation’s comment, and addressed issues relating to procedural fairness and the exercise of the trial court’s discretion.

Issue:

Whether the motion for extension of time, despite being addressed only to the Clerk of Court and not directly giving notice to the opposing party, is valid as an ex parte application in procedural matters.

• The issue centers on whether the defect in the notice, due to non-compliance with Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, is fatal to the extension granted.
• Determining if such a defect prejudiced the respondent’s substantial rights in the case.

Whether the default declaration imposed by the trial court, based on the alleged technical defect in the petitioner's extension motion, is justified.

• Consideration of whether the trial court acted prematurely in setting aside its own Order granting the extension to the petitioner.
• Evaluation of the impact of the pending Motion for Bill of Particulars and its subsequent withdrawal on the computation of the period for filing an answer.

• Whether the trial court's actions, particularly the issuance of the default order on February 14, 1975, served justice by weighing the procedural defect against the substantial rights of the litigant.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)