G.R. No. 155001 - Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.

In August 1989, DOTC commissioned Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to study NAIA capacity and terminal design.
In October 1994, Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited BOT proposal for NAIA Passenger Terminal III (PTIII).

DOTC/MIAA formed a Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) in December 1994.
PBAC issued Bid Documents; financial capability required 30% equity of estimated US$350 million project cost (≈ P2.75 billion).
Paircargo Consortium (Paircargo, PAGS, Security Bank) submitted a price challenge in September 1996.
Paircargo’s combined net worth was only ≈ P558 million (6% of cost). Despite banking‐law limits, PBAC prequalified Paircargo.
AEDC failed to match Paircargo’s guaranteed payments; Paircargo formed PIATCO on February 27, 1997.

On July 12, 1997, DOTC/MIAA and PIATCO signed the 1997 Concession Agreement (CA) granting a 25-year exclusive franchise (renewable 25 years) to build-operate-transfer PTIII.
On November 26, 1998, parties executed an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) further revising key provisions.
Three Supplements followed (1999, 2000, 2001), adding obligations on MIAA/DOTC and altering revenue and default terms.

Various groups (workers, service providers, Congressmen, MIAA employees) filed Rule 65 petitions for prohibition against implementing PIATCO Contracts (G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547, 155661).
Alleged Corps of violations: prequalification irregularities, prohibited monopoly grant, government guarantee of debts, improper adjustments of fees, impairment of existing contracts, violation of appropriation requirements, breach of Constitution and BOT Law.

Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction over these petitions for prohibition?
Do petitioners have legal standing (taxpayers, legislators, employees, service providers)?
Must the dispute be referred to arbitration under the CA/ARCA before court action?
Should the rule on hierarchy of courts bar direct resort to the Supreme Court?

Was PIATCO’s predecessor a duly prequalified bidder given its deficient financial capacity?
Did changes made in the CA and ARCA constitute material amendments to the contract bidded out, voiding the agreements for lack of rebidding?
Do provisions creating an exclusive franchise for PTIII violate the constitutional ban on exclusive public utility authorizations?
Do the CA/ARCA provisions on government assuming PIATCO’s debts constitute a prohibited direct government guarantee?
Does Section 8.01(d) of the ARCA constitute a prohibited direct government subsidy?
Do termination and default clauses violate statutory and constitutional limits on compensation and contract impairment?
Do the Supplements impose new financial obligations on government without valid appropriation?
Do contract stipulations impair existing concession and service contracts, depriving petitioners of property and liberty without due process?